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Governments worldwide spend substantial shares of their budgets on education. This 
category of expenditure is expected to produce direct benefits for the individuals receiving 
schooling, as well as indirect benefits to society as whole, since education is known to 
generate positive externalities. Improvements in education are also associated with economic 
growth and innovation. Few studies, however, have investigated whether public spending on 
education is effective at achieving the desired direct outcomes, such as improving enrolment, 
persistence and completion rates, and ensuring lower repeater and dropout rates. The research 
conducted in this study looks at the effectiveness of government spending on education. The 
main objective is to measure the impact that government spending has on all levels of 
education: primary, secondary and tertiary, for a panel of countries over the period 1990 to 
2010. This paper extends previous research since it uses panel data methods and compares 
how government spending relates to a number of educational outcomes, as defined in 
previous studies, at the three broad education levels. This study also highlights the 
differences in the relationships of interest between developed and developing countries.  
The study uses panel data methods and controls for population age, health, urbanisation and 
country fixed effects where necessary. Instrumental variable methods are used in an attempt 
to address the circular causality between public spending and educational outcomes. The 
analysis shows that government spending is not highly correlated with educational outcomes, 
defined as enrolment, persistence and repeater rates, on all levels of education. Government 
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1.1) Why is education important? 
Education is an important tool that is used throughout history to solve the vast problems that 
face the world. United States President Barack Obama gives a perfect example in his State of 
Union Address; “What if the cure for cancer is truly trapped in the mind of someone that 
cannot afford to be educated so as to unlock this potential?” (2012). Higher education is 
important because it underpins innovation such that it leads to the development of countries, 
as well as increases quality of life and decreases high mortality rates through research in the 
health system such as the cure for cancer.  
Aubyn et al describe higher education as one of the driving forces of growth (2009). This 
study, therefore, puts particular emphasis on higher education. However; education at all 
levels is valuable. It benefits the person receiving it as well as the society they are part of. 
The direct benefits from education at all levels to those who receive it span from better 
employment prospects and reduced likelihood of living in poverty  to better health. Reduced 
crime rates and improved social engagement are among its indirect benefits to society. 
Hence, government spending on education can be seen as a form of investment. 
1.2) Why is government spending on education necessary? 
As Obama points out; not everyone can afford to be educated (2012). One of the justifications 
Milton Friedman gives for government spending on schooling is to create the ideal state for 
society (1977). Public schooling is to provide a common structure of existence, of both 
behaviour and thought; whereby the members of each respective society could exist in what 
he described as a harmonious single free democratic society (Friedman, 1977). Further, since 
education results in benefits both directly to the individual receiving it and indirectly to 
society, exclusively private education will result in an under provision from society’s 
perspective, as individuals only consider the marginal value to themselves in allocating their 
spending. Thus, governments have an incentive to provide education for those who cannot 
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afford it to the social optimum point through a public schooling system that is a well-oiled, 
smooth-running machine hastily producing well-functioning individuals who are net 
contributors to the economy and society that they are part of. However, how efficient are the 
public education machines of countries around the world, in terms of their returns to public 
spending? Specifically, does government spending have an impact on public educational 
outcomes and to what extent?  This study attempts to address these questions.  
1.3) How does this study fill the knowledge gap? 
There are many microeconomic studies that estimate the private returns to education, but far 
fewer studies from a macroeconomic or international perspective. Since this is a 
macroeconomic international study, it fills the current gap in the literature. This is also an 
updated study using data for more recent time periods unlike older studies. In line with the 
second Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of universal provision of primary education, a 
substantial portion of the literature focuses on primary education and looks at the years after 
efforts to achieve this MDG have been established. 
This study, as mentioned before, focuses on higher education; defined as secondary and 
tertiary education. Thus, this study is also a continuation of existing studies, which mainly 
cover schooling on lower levels, providing points of comparison of the effectiveness of 
government spending at different educational levels with regard to a range of outcomes. This 
study also serves as an extension of other studies, as it shows the differences in the impacts of 
government spending between developed and developing countries. 
1.4) What are the research objectives of this study? 
The ultimate aim is to analyse the relationship between government spending and public 
educational outcomes. The objectives that will allow the aim to be achieved are as follows. 
The relevant literature will be reviewed to determine the factors impacting educational 
outcomes. Further, appropriate models that will express the relationship between public 
educational outcomes and government spending, whilst controlling for other explanatory 
variables, will be established. Thereafter the appropriate methodology to analyse the data will 
be determined. The data will also be observed at a basic, descriptive level. And finally; using 
the appropriate models the available international data at country level over the time period 
from 1990 to 2010 will be analysed. Tables A1 & A2 in appendix A contain lists of the 
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countries used in the analysis. Once the above mentioned objectives have been achieved; one 
will be able to address the question; does government spending have an impact on public 
educational outcomes? 
1.5) Overview of the study 
The structure of the study is as follows.  The literature relevant to this study will be reviewed 
in Chapter 2. The appropriate models that will express the relationship between public 
educational outcomes and government spending, whilst controlling for other explanatory 
variables, will be presented in Chapter 3. The data that will be used for the purpose of 
analysis in this study will be covered in the chapter after that. Chapter 4 will cover the 
econometric methodology used for the data analysis. The descriptive statistics will be 
presented in chapter 5. The data analysis will be presented in chapter 6; followed by the 












This chapter lays the theoretical foundation for studying the effectiveness of government 
spending on education. It starts with a note on the value of education in section 2.2; and leads 
into the next section 2.3; which discusses the returns to education on both a microeconomic 
and macroeconomic scale. The next section 2.4; discussed education as a production 
function. Then; in section 2.5; the reasons for government spending and involvement in 
educational markets are reviewed. Since this study is conducted in South Africa; government 
spending on schooling in South Africa specifically is reviewed in section 2.6. Section 2.7 
takes a look at the concept of effectiveness and efficiency, followed by a look at the 
ineffectiveness of Government Spending in section 2.8. The chapter ends with section 2.9 
that discusses the lagged effects. 
2.1) The Value of education 
The value of education to the nation in which the educated individual lives has long been 
recognised among economists. In his great work, “The Wealth of Nations”, Adam Smith 
explains that education improves the nation’s workforce through division of labour which 
allows for specialisation, improves efficiency and ultimately it will lead to the wealth of a 
nation (1776).  
Education is important both to the individual receiving it and to the nation in which the 
educated individual lives. The importance of education is well summarised in the words of 
South Africa’s former President Nelson Mandela: “Education is the great engine to personal 
development. It is through education that the daughter of a peasant can become a doctor, that 
the son of a mine worker can become the head of the mine that the child of farm workers can 
become the president of a great nation. It is what we make of what we have, not what we are 
given, that separates one person from another” (Gilbert, 2013, 197).  
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Adam Smith has been quoted saying that; “the difference between the most dissimilar 
characters, between a philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise 
not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education” (Becker, 1993, 121).  
And thus, overall, education is important because it serves, not only as a distinguishing factor 
to improve the prospects of individuals within a nation, but to further nations as more 
individuals within that nation become educated. 
2.2) Returns to education 
When one talks about the ‘value’ of education; it is useful to quantify this value into real 
terms such as the returns to education. There are two scales on which returns can be 
measured. Firstly; the returns to education can be measured on a microeconomic scale. This 
is explained as the returns to the educated individual. And secondly; the returns to education 
can be measured on a macroeconomic scale. This is explained as the returns to the country in 
which the educated individual resides. These returns, on both a microeconomic and 
macroeconomic scales; shall be discussed in the subsections to follow.  
2.3.1) On a microeconomic scale 
On a microeconomic scale, returns to education are seen in the form of higher earnings for 
the individual (Mincer, 1974). In other words; the more education an individual receives, the 
more income they can potentially earn. These potential higher earnings provide incentives for 
individuals to pursue highest level of education that they are capable of attaining. Thus, even 
for an individual that does not value education in itself, may potentially value education 
because they value the greater earnings that might come with obtaining a higher level of 
education. Regardless of the value of education to an individual; human capital theory 
describes spending on schooling as an investment in human capital (Becker, 1993).  
As Becker explains; the investment in human capital has a rate of return that can be measured 
(1993). An individuals’ incentive to get an education is based on their measure of the rate of 
return to receiving an education (Becker, 1993). According to Becker; if an individual sees a 
greater return to their investment in education than the next person, then they have a higher 
rate of returns to education and are more likely to place a higher value on education (1993).  
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The individual who puts greater value on education may or may not be able to afford it his 
presents a case for the importance of public education. The importance of public education 
lies in the fact that; if an individual values education but does not pursue it because they 
cannot afford it, then they ultimately become ‘wasted potential’. In any given nation, all over 
the world, many individuals are intrinsically equally capable of benefiting from education; 
only poverty prevents most from acquiring one (Becker, 1993). As important as it is for each 
and every individual in any given nation to reach their full potential by receiving as much 
education as they have an incentive to do. Further, as explained by Stevens & Weale; since 
education benefits individuals, one would expect there to be benefits when grouping 
individuals (2003). This introduces the next subsection discussing macroeconomic returns. 
2.3.2) On a Macroeconomic scale 
Policy makers are concerned with the effectiveness of public spending, particularly on 
education, because of the belief that it can increase economic growth and decrease poverty 
(Gupta et al, 2002). According to Krueger & Lindahl, education reinforces income growth 
(2000). Primary education skills are related to growth in developing countries whilst tertiary 
education skills are most important for growth in developed countries (Blundell et al, 
1999).Positive externalities, in the form of reduced crime and technological progress, are a 
result of investments in higher education, and schooling is positively associated with 
economic growth (Krueger & Lindahl, 2000).  
Krueger & Lindahl (2000) present the reasons why the correlation occurs.  Countries with an 
improved education system are more likely to change other policies, not necessarily only 
those polices directly linked to education, in ways that enhance growth. In other words, 
education becomes both the start of development process and the means to an end – namely 
growth. Hence, Krueger & Lindahl describe education as the seed as well as the flower of 
economic improvement (2000). Friedman acknowledges that education leads to an increase in 
the productivity of an individual and this, on a macroeconomic scale, will result in a society 
that is greater in productivity and economic growth (1955). Similarly, Blundell et al argue 
that education spurs innovation and this ultimately accelerates the rate of economic growth 
(1999). The concept of education driving self-sustaining growth can be described in new 
growth literature (Blundell et al, 1999).  
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New growth literature seeks to define human capital as a primary source of innovation 
(Blundell et al, 1999). This means that education is directly connected with productivity and 
growth. In other words; if a country’s education level was to increase then the country’s 
economy will grow. And since economic growth is a return to education, it makes sense that 
effective government spending on education would be seen as a worthwhile investment. 
Empirically; countries that expanded their education sector (or spending?) during the 1960s, 
experienced faster growth some thirty years later (Blundell et al, 1999). This type of growth 
could be seen as having lagged effects. A larger stock of educated workers might be a cause 
of technological change (Blundell et al, 1999). Many educated workers might enhance 
productivity which could spur further development of newer technologies and it is highly 
likely that these new technologies will require individuals that are more highly educated 
(Blundell et al, 1999). This knock-on effect creates an upward spiral of growth, where more 
educated individuals in the workplace will create a greater need for education and so on. 
Economic growth, measured by living standards, is acknowledged as being one of the most 
important macroeconomic returns to education (Stevens & Weale, 2003). There are numerous 
examples of this. For example, the development and growth that were seen in Europe; 
throughout history, was not as apparent in the illiterate places in the world (Stevens & Weale, 
2003). Thus; as a country’s population becomes more educated, the standards of living in that 
country will improve as well. Whilst Stevens & Weale qualify living standards as the most 
appropriate result of an educated nation, they also quantify the link between education and 
economic performance (2003). Empirically; a one percentage point increase in the secondary 
enrolment rate raises gross domestic product (GDP) per capita by 0.35 of a percentage point 
(Stevens & Weale, 2003). Similarly; Sianesi & Van Reenen show in their work, also a cross 
country study estimating the effect of school enrolment on growth, that if secondary school 
enrolment rates were to increase by one percentage point, it would lead to an increase in per 
capita GDP growth of between one and three percentage points annually (2002).  
Theoretically; there are two different approaches that one can take to the subject of education 
and growth. The first one is an application of the augmented neo-classical approach, where 
the stock of education affects the long run level of GDP per capita, whilst the second falls 
under the category of new growth theory, where the stock of education affects the rate of 
long-run growth (Sianesi & Van Reenen, 2002). If the average education in the population 
was to increase by one year, then it would raise the level of output per capita by between 
three and six percent according to the former approach. However if the same scenario were to 
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be applied to the latter; it would lead to over one percentage point faster growth according 
which is a large effect theory (Sianesi & Van Reenen, 2002). 
This phenomenon  is often referred to as Solow’s ‘residual’, explaining that the growth of 
real income per capita cannot be fully accounted for by increases in the quantities of the 
capital and labour inputs alone (2002). Empirically, the Solow residual is shown to 
incorporate the effect of secondary education on economic growth, which amounted to a 3 
percentage point increase in growth for every one percentage point increase in secondary 
school enrolment rates, ceteris paribus (Sianesi & Van Reenen, 2002). Similarly, another 
component of the Solow residual is the effect of tertiary education on economic growth, 
where a one percentage point increase in the annual growth of human capital, proxied by total 
tertiary completion; increases growth by 5.9 percentage points, ceteris paribus (Sianesi & 
Van Reenen, 2002).  
In their study; Bils & Klenow estimate the impact of schooling on the economic growth of 
human capital and find that an increase in primary and secondary enrolment rates leads to 
growth in gross domestic product per capita (2000). Bils & Klenow’s evidence supports the 
hypothesis that the higher the stock of human capital, the more economic growth there will 
be; ceteris paribus. The implication of this is that there is a positive relationship between 
schooling and the growth in gross domestic product (Bils & Klenow, 2000). Thus the 
evidence from macroeconomic studies supports the proposition that economic growth is 
influenced by the quantity of human capital that a country possesses. The link between 
human capital and growth begs the question why governments have not been able to realise 
more of the returns available through this process.   
2.3) Education as a production function 
A branch in the literature attempts to answer this question by suggesting that the education 
process can be seen as a production function, which may be prone to inefficiencies in 
converting public spending on educational inputs into educational outcomes and human 
capital. Like many other processes in the economy, this one may be subject to forces, both 
political and economic (such as fixed budgets), which may force trade-offs between different 
educational inputs (Pritchett & Filmer, 1997).  
An optimizing model predicts that the educational input use should be chosen so that the 
marginal product per unit of each input is equalized (Pritchett & Filmer, 1997). In other 
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words, the allocation of resources should be such that output is maximised. However, the 
allocation of expenditure on inputs does not conform to the cost effectiveness rule. 
Specifically, spending on educational inputs is systematically affected by how much weight 
‘teacher-related’ inputs have in determining the allocation of spending across inputs, and is 
independent of their impact on outputs (Pritchett & Filmer, 1997). Put simply, the allocation 
of spending is biased towards those educational inputs that directly increase the welfare of 
teachers for the simple fact that teachers form unions and strike for increased wages whereas 
books do not. Thus it is difficult to establish an effective education production function.  
2.4) Why is government intervention necessary? 
2.5.1) Externalities 
Since education contributes to both the literacy and knowledge that individuals commonly 
require to form part of a stable, functioning society; being educated has an effect on the 
society in which the educated individual lives (Friedman, 1955). This effect is a positive 
externality arising from education from which a society gains. Friedman refers to it as 
‘neighbourhood effects’ and uses this effect to justify government’s involvement in providing 
schooling (1955). Friedman suggests that each child requires a minimum amount of 
schooling, which will ensure that society benefits from this positive externality, (1955). This 
kind of requirement could be enforced as a law (Friedman, 1955).  
However, what would be the case if a parent could not afford to educate their child? 
Friedman gives the example of owning buildings and cars when addressing the issue of what 
one can do if they cannot afford the upkeep a legal requirement related to ownership (1955). 
The owners will ‘divest’ themselves of the item. Now considering - the case if one were to 
say that parents are rightfully the ‘owners’ of their children. And if the parent cannot afford 
the minimum amount of schooling that is enforced by law; would parents be forced to divest 
themselves of the item, which in this case would be the child, in question? 
Friedman argues that in the case of requirements concerning children’s schooling, the 
separation of a child from a parent who cannot afford the minimum requirement of education 
is against all beliefs and ideas of a free and well-functioning society (1955). Thus, 
government has to assume the monetary costs of providing schooling in the form of public 
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education. Since these ‘neighbourhood effects’ are positive, it would essentially be an 
investment and not an expense for government to provide public education. 
Furthermore, Friedman justifies government spending on higher education because it is 
beneficial in two ways (1955). Firstly, the compensation of costs is the only viable way to 
impose a minimum requirement of education; and secondly, the financing of further 
education can be motivated with the idea that other members of society will benefit from the 
education of those of ‘greater interest and ability’ since this is a way of providing better 
‘political and social leadership’ (Friedman, 1955). Hence, government spending on education 
can be justified on the basis of the broader economic and social gains resulting from it. 
2.5.2) Market Failures 
Economists recognize that education has distinctive features that imply that market provision 
may lead to lower levels of educational attainment in a population than would maximize 
societal welfare (Mitch, 2008). This scenario is more formally known as ‘market failure’. 
Since the benefits do not only accrue to the person who receives education, but to society as a 
whole, private demand for education will be below the level that is socially optimal (Mitch, 
2008). In other words, the market has failed to determine the amount of education that is truly 
necessary for society, as well as the only the private value of education is considered by 
individuals. Hence, governments are called to intervene. As Mitch explains; governments 
solve the problem of market failure due to the positive externalities from education through 
providing subsidies (2008).  
Another failure in education markets can be due to imperfections in capital markets. In other 
words, parents can find it difficult to borrow so that they can finance their children’s 
education (Mitch, 2008). This is known as the capital goods problem and it arises because, 
according to Mitch, education is excludable (2008).  Excludability is the case when children 
are prevented from attending school because their parents cannot afford to the price of 
sending their child to school (Mitch, 2008).  
The capital goods problem brings about a whole new set of externalities except this time, the 
externalities are negative. For example, if a child is not educated, it will render them more 
prone to be involved in criminal activity, which in turn will not only harm the family of the 
child and the child herself, but it will be harmful to society (Mitch, 2008). In addition, 
uneducated children are less civic-minded and thus will be more dysfunctional in society. As 
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mentioned earlier, individuals do not take all the concerns discussed above into consideration 
when deciding how much education to obtain (Mitch, 2008). In other words; parents will 
‘selfishly’ decide how much education to give their children based on how much money they 
earn. This depicts the market failure that calls for government intervention since parents 
cannot be the only party responsible for deciding how much education their children receive. 
The last failure in the education market arises from the limited influence that parents have 
over the quality of their children’s education and the limited extent of supervision that parents 
can apply regarding the education process without being involved directly (Mitch, 2008). 
This occurs even if parents are paying in full for their child’s education. Thus, a further 
failure exists in the education market, if parents, paying or not, cannot control the quality of 
education that their child is receiving. There is a justification for government intervention in 
setting and enforcing standards for quality and overseeing the process of delivery. 
To conclude, since externalities and market failures are present, governments need to provide 
public education to encourage benefits such as neighbourhood effects, and to avoid negative 
consequences from the limitations of capital markets, difficulty in enforcing educational 
standards and lack of supervision.  
2.6) Government Spending in South Africa 
Bloom et al report that, in South Africa; the number institutions of education have been 
steadily increasing over the years (2006). An increase in the number of institutions for 
education has led to more individuals receiving education. The result of this would be an 
increase in individual gains from higher earnings (Bloom et al, 2006). Importantly, however, 
higher earning can lead to a virtuous cycle. Since more educated individuals will be able to 
earn more, consumption will increase which will raise demand, subsequently increasing 
supply and leading to economic growth, resulting in raised tax revenues for governments, 
which allow for further spending on education. Education would encourage new 
technologies, develop new tools and skills, generate entrepreneurship and create jobs (Bloom, 
et al, 2006).  
This favourable cycle has not yet taken full effect. It is important to take into account South 
Africa’s divided historical past in order to truly understand the educational outcomes at 
present and potentially in the future as well as their impacts on poverty (van der Berg, 2008). 
In his 2008 work, Servaas van der Berg discusses poverty and educational outcomes in South 
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Africa. Van der Berg shows in his study that socio-economic differentials in the past still play 
a role in educational outcomes in South African schooling today (2008).  
However; the schooling system is not yet able to overcome the patterns of inherited 
disadvantages and also suggests that policy interventions are necessary, but are just not as 
effective as they could be (Van der Berg, 2008). In other words; resources did not necessarily 
improve school performance. The differential factor with South Africa is that not only do 
governments have to take effective spending into consideration but they also have to establish 
that that there is educational inequality between South African schools (van der Berg, 2008). 
This is an educational challenge that is important to overcome since the lagged after-effects 
from the past continue to have an unfairly heavy bearing on certain individuals. Due to its 
divided past; there are certain challenges that the South African education system faces.  
The quality of secondary school passes does not prepare students for tertiary education 
(Jones, 2013). And thus even if one was to complete secondary schooling, they may not be in 
a position to enrol in tertiary education. Rural schools suffer with backlogs of the delivery of 
school materials as well as the development of infrastructure that affect educational outcomes 
for those areas (Jones, 2013). This is something that is specific to South Africa since 
historical circumstances have placed a large gap between the quality of education in a rural 
area and the quality of education in an urban area.  
2.7) Effectiveness and Efficiency 
Aubyn et al define efficiency as the comparison between inputs and produced outputs (2009). 
If the certain level of inputs produce less than the maximum output attainable with current 
technology, then the production of the output is said to be inefficient (Aubyn et al, 2009). 
2.8) The ineffectiveness of Government Spending 
The figure below is taken from Coulson (2014) and it shows academic performance and 
spending in America over the past 40 years. As one can clearly see; spending on education 
has been steadily increasing over the last 4 decades. Unfortunately educational outcomes 
such as enrolment and math and reading score; have not been increasing.  
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Figure 2.1: Trends in American Public Schooling since 1970: 
 
Source: Coulson, 2014 
Two conclusions were made in Coulson’s study. First, spending increases are not necessarily 
accompanied by improvements in performance (Coulson, 2014).  Second, educational 
outcomes seem entirely disconnected from any fluctuations in spending. Even when spending 
decreased; there was no decrease in outcomes. Thus, public expenditure is said to not be 
correlated with schooling outcomes. 
2.9) The presence of Lags and Lagged effects 
In 2009; Trostel did a study of the state-support elasticity of college enrolment and college 
degree attainment. He used twenty two years of United States interstate data from 1985 to 
2006. And thus one must acknowledge the possibility of the presence of lagged effects. 
Gujarati & Porter call such a relationship one that is “not contemporaneous” (2010, 372). 
These models are also known as dynamic models because they involve changes over time 
(Gujarati & Porter, 2010). In other words; the effect of a unit change in the explanatory 
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variable is distributed over a number of periods. Thus it may be difficult to accurately find 
the effect of government spending on education in one time period. 
2.10) Concluding remarks 
Government intervention to provide public education is important. However; not all spending 
done by government will produce efficient results. Once government can spend in such a way 
that the resources they put into education corresponds the most efficient outcomes, then 
government spending will be effective. In the next chapter; the variables that influence 








The aim of this chapter is to review a few of the empirical studies related to the factors 
affecting educational outcomes. Since the empirical model used in subsequent chapter is 
based on these studies, they are discussed in more detail.  
3.2) Government spending on education: An Empirical Review 
Empirically, substantial public spending on schooling leads to significantly greater 
educational attainment (Trostel, 2009). Using twenty two years of United States interstate 
data from 1985 to 2006, the results of Trostel’s study indicate a state-support, measured as 
government expenditure on tertiary education, elasticity of college enrolment and degree 
attainment of about 0.35. Econometric models that utilise instrumental variable methods are 
used to ensure that there are only exogenous influences and to account for any biases. 
This study aims to develop a cross-country model similar to that employed by Gupta et al 
(2002) in order to study the effectiveness of government spending in driving educational 
outcomes,. Further, the aim is also to expand the analysis using a larger number of countries 
and employing more rigorous methods that panel data allows for. Hence, Gupta et al’s results 
are reviewed here for reference purposes. The models reflect the determinants of three 
educational outcomes (two positive and one negative): enrolment rates, persistence rates and 
dropout rates, at primary school level. Government spending is included as two different 
measures. The first is the percentage of total education spending dedicated to primary and 
secondary education. The second is total education spending as a percentage of GDP, which 
caters for differences in the sizes of the economies and different fiscal regimes.  
In order to measure the age of the population and the share that is of primary school going 
age, Gupta et al include the percent of the population that is between 0 and 14 years old as an 
explanatory variable. The authors also control for health factors (proxied by the child 
mortality rate), family incomes (proxied by income per capita measured by purchasing 
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power), and ease of access to schools (proxied by urbanisation; defined as a scale of 
population concentration).   
Gupta et al use cross-sectional data for 1993 to 1994. The adjusted R-squared values show 
that the models have significant explanatory value. The authors find a significantly positive 
correlation between both variables that represent government spending and the educational 
outcomes defined by the enrolment rate and persistence through schooling.  
Table 2.1 Cross-section regression results for selected developing and transition countries 









Observations 42 24 38 
Primary and secondary education 
spending 















Population Age 0 – 14 years 







Child mortality rate 























Adjusted R - squared 0.67 0.50 0.42 
*significance at a level of 10 % 
**significance at a level of 5 % 
***significance at a level of 1 % 
Source: Gupta et al, 2002 
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There is a significantly negative correlation between government spending and education 
outcomes when they are defined by a negative indicator, such as dropout rates. If child 
mortality rates increase, then enrolment and persistence rates decrease, thus it is important for 
schooling to go hand-in-hand with good nutrition for students. This is something that 
governments can invest in, so as to positively influence educational outcomes.  
 
A similar situation is apparent in the variable called urbanisation. There is a positive 
correlation between urbanisation and educational outcomes in the form of enrolment and 
persistence rates. Thus the more urbanised a country is, the better the educational outcomes 
will be. This is as expected due to the assumption that urbanisation brings better quality 
education and potentially easier access to schooling.  
Gupta et al conclude that their study provides evidence that with an increase in spending on 
education brings about an increase in educational attainment (2002). Thus, if greater spending 
on education is to boost economic growth and promote the well-being of the poor, then policy 
makers should pay more attention to this portion of public expenditure (Gupta et al, 2002). 
The allocations of the budget to spending on education, the size as well as the efficiency of 
spending in the correct places, is seen to be an important vehicle to promote reformation and 
equity (Gupta et al, 2002). 
3.3) Determinants of Education 
With reference to the study conducted by Gupta et al, the similar model used in this study is 
presented below (2002).  
Υit  =  ā1 ± a2х2it ± a3х3it ± ... ± anхnit + δi + ρt + υit             (1) 
Here, Y is the dependent variable with individual effects i across time period t, ā1 and υit are 
the intercept and error terms respectively; a2 is the coefficient on the first independent 
variable х2 with individual effects i across time period t; a3 is the coefficient on the second 
independent variable х3 with individual effects i across time period t; continued until the 
coefficient on the nth independent variable хn with individual effects i across time period t. 





3.4) Dependent Variables: educational outcomes 
The dependent variables in each of the three models are the measures of educational 
outcomes. In the study done by Gupta et al, the measures of educational attainment are 
primary school enrolment, persistence through primary school and primary school dropout 
rates (2002). The same dependent variables will be used in this study, but the analysis will be 
extended to cover secondary and tertiary education, too. The objective of this study is to test 
Gupta et al’s ideas on all  levels of schooling. 
 Since Gupta et al used primary school enrolment as a dependent variable in one of their 
models, it is appropriate to use this enrolment variable as the first dependent variable in the 
primary, secondary and tertiary models (2002). Gupta et al defined another one of their 
models by persistence through primary school (2002). Thus, it is fitting to define persistence 
as the next dependent variable in the primary, secondary and tertiary education models in this 
study. Due to data constraints, the last model of education, with repeater rates as the 
dependent variable, is only applied to a primary and secondary education. Gupta et al use 
primary school dropout rates instead of repeater rates. However, due to the nature of and 
availability of the data, repeater rates will be used instead. .  
3.5) Government spending 
The main explanatory variable that this study is concerned with is government spending on 
education. This variable appears in a number of ways in the models. Gupta et al include two 
measures of government spending (2002). Firstly; it is included as a measure of total 
government spending on education as a percentage of total public expenditure. In this study, 
this measure has been included as well.  
Secondly; Gupta et al include government expenditure as a measure of the share of spending 
on primary and secondary education (2002). In this study includes the same measure: namely, 
government spending per level of education as a share of total public spending on education. 
Public expenditure on education includes government spending on educational institutions, 





3.6) Other explanatory Variables 
Since government spending is not the only variable that impacts educational outcomes. There 
are other variables that will be controlled for in each regression namely income, population 
age, urbanisation and child mortality. These variables, according to Gupta et al, influence 
educational outcomes (2002). 
3.6.1) Income (GNI) 
If the income of households should increase, then the expected result would be for the cost of 
enrolment at both secondary and tertiary levels of education to be relatively less (Gupta et al, 
2002). Thus changes in income are expected to have a positive impact on educational 
outcomes.  
3.6.2) Population Age 
Since the age of the population influences school enrolment, Gupta et al include a variable 
that measured the percentage of population in the age group 0 to 14 years old (2002). 
According to the authors, it is easier to increase enrolment rates in primary but harder to 
increase enrolment rates in higher levels, if a country has a relatively young population 
(2002). In this study, the population age will be included as the official (as defined by the 
World Data Bank for each country) primary aged population and the study will attempt to 
observe the affects of this on secondary and tertiary education, as well as primary. 
3.6.3) Urbanisation 
The definition of ‘urbanisation’ is the process by which societies develop, cities grow and 
rural areas become more urbanised (Farlex, 2012). Lack of infrastructure and higher mortality 
rates are more common in rural areas than in urban areas (Gupta et al, 2002). Starting from 
low levels, increased urbanisation is linked to better health for a nation, and if health is a 
correlate of education, then urbanisation is expected to lead to improved health, which is 
positively related to education. Here, urbanisation is included as a variable that measures 
population density at country level. This variable also captures the effects of overpopulation 




3.6.4) Child Mortality 
This variable is measured as the number of children under the age of five that die per 1 000 
live births. It reflects child nutrition and health. Gupta et al use child mortality as a proxy for 
child nutrition (2002, 721). Child nutrition is vitally important to all levels of education 
because it affects enrolment as well as persistence rates (Gupta et al, 2002, 721). It is 
expected that increases in child mortality rates will result in decreases in educational 
outcomes at all levels of education.  
3.7) Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has provided an overview of the foundation for the models that will be used to 
measure the impact of government spending on educational outcomes. As in earlier studies 
about the determinant of educational outcomes, the dependent variables to be used are 
enrolment rates, persistence rates and repeater rates. The independent variables include 
different measures of government spending as the main variables of interest, and the control 
variables per capita income, population age, urbanisation, child mortality. The variables that 
have been introduced in this chapter will be fully defined descriptively in chapter 5. The next 
chapter aims to discuss the econometric methodology that the study employs and covers the 





4.1) The Limitations of Ordinary Least Squares 
One of the most frequently used methods in data analysis is the method of OLS (Gujarati & 
Porter, 2010). This study utilises panel data econometric models, but basic Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) estimates are included for comparison purposes. This chapter reviews the 
problems with OLS estimates and how the use of panel data and instrumental variables can 
address some of these shortcomings. One of the main limitations of OLS is endogeneity; it 
shall be discussed in the section 4.2. One of the methods used to combat the effects of 
endogeneity is the instrumented variables approach (IV); this method shall be discussed in 
section 4.3. The remainder of the chapter is made up of a discussion of other limitations as 
well as a brief note on the level of development in countries and how this has been included 
in the analysis. 
4.2) Endogeneity 
It is likely that circular causality exists in the relationship between education and government 
spending. Endogeneity can be defined by circular causality between the variables (Carleton, 
2002). A correlation that is known as a ‘two-way causality’ can be described as an instance 
where the “predictive variable is dependent on the variable of prediction” (Schmit & Phelps, 
1985, 33). The correlation becomes causal and circular. No specific test for endogeneity has 
been conducted in this study but theoretical reasons for the presence of endogeneity are 
considered. 
An increased funding for education by the government would cause a generation of more 
educated people that will support the idea of education to the next generation. This in turn 
will cause a demand for more education, applying pressure on the government to spend more 
on education and so it will continue in this circular pattern. Circular causality may thus be 
problematic when studying this relationship and the attempted remedy for the problem here 
are instrumented variables.  
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What needs to be specified now, in terms of the literature, is that the instrumented variable is 
still government spending but it is captured and used in a different way to the variables 
recognised as affected by circular causality. The way in which this is done is by replacing 
government spending on the level of education of interest in the model, for example primary 
education, with government spending on  the other levels of education, in this example, 
secondary and tertiary education). 
4.3) Instrumented Variables (IV) 
“A solution to endogenous estimates” is what the instrumental variable method is most 
commonly known as (Baum, 2009, 2). In this study, this method will be used in order to 
combat endogeneity caused by the circular causality between government expenditure and 
educational outcomes. 
Recall equation (1):  
 
Υit  =  ā1 ± a2х2it ± a3х3it ± ... ± anхnit + δi + ρt + υit           (1) 
When the IV principle is applied to it, the result is as follows; 
 
ΣΥIV хIV = nâ1 ± â2Σх2 хIV ± â3Σх3 хIV ± ... ± ânΣхn хIV + δi + ρt + υit       (2) 
 
Instrumented variables are proxies for endogenous estimates (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). These 
proxy variables need to be correlated with the problematic variables and uncorrelated with 
the dependent variable in order for the IV method to be useful.  
Gupta et al use military spending and foreign aid received as instruments for education 
spending (2002). This makes sense in a study such as theirs, since they include only 
developing and transitioning economies. It is also logical for the time period that they cover. 
It is less applicable in this study, since there is a different time frame and this study covers 
developed as well as developing countries.  
A study conducted by Trostel (2009) adopts an instrumentation strategy that is likely be more 
applicable to this study. Trostel estimates  the effects of public support (public spending) on 
college attainment by using two variables as instruments for the endogenous spending 
variable of interest: state funding for postsecondary education per potential student 
(2009).The two instruments are primary education expenditure and secondary education 
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expenditure (Trostel, 2009). Trostel explains that government spending on higher education 
could depend on the number of pupils that are enrolled in higher education (2009). He goes 
on to describe the dependency as a potentially significant difficulty, since government 
spending on tertiary education might not be exogenous (Trostel, 2009).  
This study faces the same problem, thus the same the solution is applied in order to fight the 
issue of endogeneity. Since Trostel uses primary education expenditure and secondary 
education expenditure as instruments for government spending on tertiary education, the 
same concept is applied in the models of tertiary education outcomes in this study. 
Analogously, in the models related to primary education outcomes, the instruments employed 
are government expenditure on secondary and tertiary education; and when looking at models 
pertaining to secondary education outcomes, the instruments used are expenditure on primary 
and tertiary education. 
4.4) Fixed effects 
There are two types of effects that a panel data model could have: random or fixed. (Hill et al, 
2008). It is important to determine what effects are present in the model because certain 
assumptions fall in place when either type of model is employed. In the random effects 
model, the error term is purely unsystematic (Cameron et al, 2010). In contrast, in the fixed-
effects model, it is assumed that the error term has a degree of correlation with the 
independent variables (Cameron et al, 2010). The Hausman test is used to determine which 
model specification is more appropriate for the underlying data (Cameron et al, 2010). By 
conducting Hausman tests for each specification (estimation equation), one is able to 
differentiate between which of the models, fixed or random effects, is better. This test is the 
similar to a t-test, a decision is made based on the statistic that the test produces.  
4.5) Level of development 
The study done by Gupta et al looks at a selection of developing and ‘transitioning’ countries 
(2002). This study considers developing as well as developed countries in an attempt to 
compare the impact of government spending on education outcomes between countries at 
different levels of development. Tables A1 & A2 in appendix A contain lists of the countries 
used in the analysis. Gupta et al do not specify how the countries in their study have been 
sorted according to levels of development. In this study, countries have been sorted according 
to the International Monetary Fund definitions of development. Specifically, developed 
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countries are the countries deemed by the IMF as ‘advanced’ and the remaining countries are 
grouped under the ‘developing countries’ category. Each specification has been tested for all 
countries, and then estimated separately for advanced economies and for less advanced or 
developing economies. 
4.6) Missing Values 
Panel data is affected by missing values and attrition. While the latter problem is less likely to 
be an issue for country-level data, the problem of missing values is usually serious.  It is the 
repeated nature of recording data that makes panel data useful in addressing problems that are 
difficult to tackle with cross-sectional data.  However, missing values create an unbalanced 
panel and insufficient observations reduce the accuracy of regression estimates.  
Values are missing for different reasons. There could be no fixed pattern of missing values 
and so they are missing at random. Alternatively, there could be a specific reason why values 
are missing and so there is a systematic pattern. This bias can be addressed by determining 
the reason why values are missing, either randomly or systematically.  
However, the fixed effects method, as discussed in subsection 4.4, cannot address systematic 
patterns of missing values. What has been noticed in the data is that developing countries had 
more missing values and this has been addressed somewhat by generating a separate set of 
estimates for developing countries and advanced countries, as discussed in subsection 4.5. 
Further investigation into the pattern of missing values is beyond the scope of this study. 
4.7) Lagged effects 
Trostel (2009) shows the concept of lagged effects in his study, using twenty two years of 
United States interstate data from 1985 to 2006. This reflects the intuitive idea that the effects 
of government spending are realised over long periods.  Hence, models taking lagged effects 
into account have also been estimated in the subsequent analysis. This subsection briefly 
considers   the distributed lag effects model. This particular regression model assumes that 
the relationship between the dependent variable Y and the explanatory variables, the X’s, is 
not contemporaneous, that is, not at the same point in time (Gujarati & Porter, 372, 2010).  
The concept is that the Y variable depends not only on the X variable in the current time 
period but the X variable in the time period before, or even before that. In other words; there 
may be a lagged relationship between Y and the X’s. To illustrate, let Yit be the variable at 
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time t, Xit be the variable at time t, Xit-1 be the variable at time (t - 1), and Xit-2 be the variable 
at time (t - 2). Now consider the model 
  Y it = A + B0Xit + B1Xit-1 + B2Xit-2 + uit   (3) 
As this model shows, because of the lagged terms Xit-1 and Xit-2, the relationship between Y 
and X is not contemporaneous. Models like this are called dynamic models and involve 
changes over time. The effect of a unit change in the value of the explanatory variables is felt 
over a number of time periods, for example, three time periods in the model of equation 4.1. 
4.8) Heteroscedasticity 
In each of the models of education, one can assume that the conditional distribution of each 
dependent variable corresponding to the given value of the independent variable has the same 
variance. In other words, the individual dependent variables are spread around their mean 
values with the same variance (Gujarati & Porter, 2010). This is known as homoscedasticity; 
meaning equal variance.  
If this is not the case, however, then there is a case of heteroscedasticity; meaning unequal 
variance. In some cases in the data analysis; there may be cases of heteroscedasticity present 
and thus this may be the cause that some coefficient estimates are not as statistically 
significant as they could be if homoscedasticity was the case. Tests for heteroscedasticity 
have been included with the data analysis in chapter 6.  
4.9) Autocorrelation 
The term autocorrelation can be defined as the correlation between members of observations 
ordered over time and across individual section (Gujarati & Porter, 2010). If there is no 
autocorrelation, then the expected value of the product of two different error terms is zero. 
Thus, with autocorrelation, the error term relating to any observation is influenced by the 
error term relating to any other observation (Gujarati & Porter, 2010). In the presence of 
autocorrelation, OLS estimates will be unbiased but they will not be efficient. Tests for 
autocorrelation have been included with the data analysis in chapter 6.  
4.10) Multicollinearity 
In each of the models of education, one can assume that there is no exact linear relationship 
between the explanatory variables (Gujarati & Porter, 2010). This is the assumption of no 
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multicollinearity. If no perfect multicollinearity exists, then this means that any variable 
cannot be expressed as an exact linear function another variable.  
If any variable in the model can be expressed as an exact linear function of another variable 
in the regression then there would be a case of multicollinearity present within the regression. 
Similar to the case of heteroscedasticity, as discussed above; there may be some cases in the 
data analysis where there will be cases of imperfect multicollinearity. This may be the cause 
that some variables are not as statistically significant as they could be if there was no 
multicollinearity present in the regression. 
4.11) Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this chapter was to discuss the econometric methodology used in this study. Other 
studies were considered to determine what the best way to analyse the data would be. The 
next chapter presents the variables, as chosen in chapter 3, and the data in a descriptive way. 







This chapter looks at the data descriptively through use of graphs; plotting the variables over 
time in order to explore general trends in the variables of interest. The variables used in the 
data analysis will also be defined in this chapter. 
5.2) Data 
The data used was obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators databank. The 
World Bank’s definition of a country has been used. For example, Reunion and Taiwan 
appear in the data as countries where in reality they could be considered territories of France 
and China. The data is an unbalanced panel data because it is both cross sectional and time 
series but with missing values (Arellano, 2003). For the time series, the years used are from 
1990 to 2010 and for the cross section part of the panel; there are 216 countries; for a full 
listing of countries, see Appendix A. 
5.3) Variable Descriptions 
This subsection contains definitions of the variables used in the data analysis. The 
descriptions for all variables are according to World Data Bank definitions. The long 
definitions of the dependent and main independent variables are defined in Table 5.1 & 5.2. 
The control variables are defined as follows.  
The Gross National Income per capita (GNI) variable is used as proxy for individual income 
and it is measured as gross national income divided by midyear population. It is the sum of 
value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in 
the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and 




The mortality rate variable is used as an indirect measure of child nutrition. It is measured as 
the probability per 1,000 that a new born baby will die before reaching age five, subject to 
age-specific mortality rates of the specified year.  
The population age variable used in the models related to all the models, at a primary and 
secondary and tertiary level of education, is the share of population that are the official age, 
in each country, to be able to attend primary education. And so this is measured as a 
percentage of the total population. The population size is based on the de facto definition of 
population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship, except for 
refugees not permanently settled in the country that are generally considered part of the 
population of the country of origin.  
The population density variable is used as an indirect measure of urbanisation. It is the 
midyear measure of the population divided by land area in square kilometres. Population is 
measured in the same way as mentioned above for the population age variable. The land area 
is a country's total area, excluding area under inland water bodies, national claims to 
continental shelf, and exclusive economic zones. In most cases the definition of inland water 
bodies includes major rivers and lakes. 
Table 5.1: Long Definitions of Dependent variables: 
Indicator 
Name 
Enrolment Rate Persistence Rate Repeater Rate 
Long 
Definition 
Gross intake ratio in first 
grade of primary education 
is the number of new 
entrants in the first grade of 
primary education 
regardless of age, expressed 
as a percentage of the 
population of the official 
primary entrance age. 
Persistence to last grade of 
primary is the percentage of 
children enrolled in the first 
grade of primary school who 
eventually reach the last 
grade of primary education. 
The estimate is based on the 
reconstructed cohort method. 
Percentage of repeaters in 
primary/ secondary/ tertiary 
for all grades. Total is the 
number of students enrolled 
in the same grade as in the 
previous year, as a 
percentage of all students 
enrolled in primary/ 










Data may be inaccurate 
when new entrants and 
repeaters are not correctly 
distinguished. 
Enrolment rates may be 
greater than 100% since 
there are those enrolling 
who are older than the 
official enrolment age. 
Aggregate data are based on 
World Bank estimates. 
 Calculated by dividing the 
sum of all repeaters in all 
grades of primary/ 
secondary/tertiary education 
by the total enrolment in that 
level of education and 




Source: World Development Indicators databank 
Table 5.2: Long Definitions of Independent variables: 
Indicator 
Name 
Spending on education Share of public expenditure 
per level of education 
Current expenditure per 




expenditure on education 
(current, capital, and 
transfers) is expressed as a 
percentage of total general 
government expenditure on 
all sectors (including 
health, education, social 
services, etc.). It includes 
expenditure funded by 
transfers from international 
sources to government. 
General government 
usually refers to local, 
regional and central 
governments. 
 
Government expenditure per 
level of education is the 
average general government 
expenditure (current, capital, 
and transfers) per level of 
education, expressed as a 
percentage of public 
expenditure on education. It 
includes expenditure funded 
by transfers from 
international sources to 
government. General 
government usually refers to 
local, regional and central 
governments 
 
Government expenditure per 
level of education is the 
average general government 
expenditure (current, capital, 
and transfers) at the given 
level of education. It includes 
expenditure funded by 
transfers from international 
sources to government. 
General government usually 





As a% of  total public 
expenditure 
 
As a share of   public 
expenditure on education 
 
In Local Currency Units 
 
Source: World Development Indicators databank 
5.4.) Descriptive Statistics 
This subsection aims to describe the variables used in the data analysis using descriptive 
statistics. Two main methods of descriptions are going to be used. Firstly, the variables will 
be presented in correlation matrices. Secondly, the variables will be presented in graphs so 
that one can observe the trends of these variables over time. 
5.4.1) Variable Correlation 
This subsection presents the correlations between the variables that are to be used in the 






Table 5.3: Primary Schooling: Enrolment Rate: 










Enrol 1        
Gov Spend 0.0183 1       
Current 
Prim Spend 
0.1586 0.0558 1      
GNI 0.0428 -0.1297 -0.0602 1     
Pop Age -0.023 -0.24 -0.2902 -0.0181 1    
Child 
Mortality 
-0.2334 -0.2535 -0.3046 -0.0601 0.8235 1   
Urban -0.0218 -0.0668 -0.0824 0.1197 -0.129 -0.1095 1  
Share Prim  
Spend 
0.0732 -0.2761 -0.2768 0.1052 0.7765 0.6048 -0.0473 1 
Source: Own calculations using the World Development Indicators databank 
Table 5.4: Primary Schooling: Persistence Rate 
Source: Own calculations using the World Development Indicators databank 
Table 5.5: Primary Schooling: Repeater Rate 
Source: Own calculations using the World Development Indicators databank 
 










Persist 1        
Gov Spend 0.2731 1       
Current 
Prim Spend 
0.3084 0.1166 1      
GNI 0.0756 -0.1292 -0.0769 1     
Pop Age -0.8211 -0.2574 -0.3211 -0.0425 1    
Child 
Mortality 
-0.8127 -0.2393 -0.393 -0.0829 0.8241 1   
Urban 0.0527 -0.0956 -0.0619 0.0805 -0.0849 -0.0801 1  
Share Prim 
Spend 
-0.6747 -0.2498 -0.338 0.11 0.8116 0.6174 -0.0355 1 










Repeat 1        
Gov Spend -0.2085 1       
Current 
Prim Spend 
-0.2179 0.1031 1      
GNI -0.1162 -0.1361 -0.0512 1     
Pop Age 0.7171 -0.2412 -0.2874 -0.0362 1    
Child 
Mortality 
0.7286 -0.2321 -0.353 -0.0811 0.8221 1   
Urban -0.0771 -0.0921 -0.0605 0.0449 -0.0979 -0.0861 1  
Share Prim 
Spend 
0.4878 -0.2716 -0.3134 0.1071 0.785 0.6026 -0.0667 1 
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Table 5.6: Secondary: Enrolment: 
Source: Own calculations using the World Development Indicators databank 
Table 5.7: Secondary: Persist: 










Persist 1        
Gov Spend 0.3335 1       
Current Sec 
Spend 
0.1005 0.0778 1      
GNI 0.0856 -0.1421 -0.0248 1     
Pop Age -0.8229 -0.3088 -0.195 -0.0857 1    
Child 
Mortality 
-0.8184 -0.2677 -0.1713 -0.1004 0.8325 1   
Urban 0.0686 -0.0924 -0.0198 0.0556 -0.1421 -0.1046 1  
Share Sec 
Spend 
0.489 0.0738 -0.0689 0.0096 -0.5617 -0.4012 0.0186 1 
Source: Own calculations using the World Development Indicators databank 
Table 5.8: Secondary: Repeat: 










Repeat 1        
Gov Spend -0.1654 1       
Current Sec 
Spend 
-0.294 0.0811 1      
GNI -0.1477 -0.1607 -0.0223 1     
Pop Age 0.6284 -0.2851 -0.2206 0.0188 1    
Child 
Mortality 
0.6681 -0.2247 -0.1998 -0.0467 0.8281 1   
Urban -0.0962 -0.0826 -0.0229 0.023 -0.0968 -0.0914 1  
Share Sec 
Spend 
-0.2561 0.0685 0.0317 -0.0749 -0.6566 -0.4696 -0.0334 1 
Source: Own calculations using the World Development Indicators databank 










Enrol 1        
Gov Spend 0.2538 1       
Current Sec 
Spend 
0.2955 0.019 1      
GNI -0.0073 -0.1447 -0.0235 1     
Pop Age -0.7977 -0.2148 -0.2762 -0.0023 1    
Child 
Mortality 
-0.8064 -0.2064 -0.2094 -0.0526 0.8112 1   
Urban 0.0511 -0.0702 -0.0156 0.1144 -0.1021 -0.0797 1  
Share Sec 
Spend 
0.384 0.0526 0.0247 -0.0685 -0.5933 -0.4158 0.0831 1 
32 
 
Table 5.9: Tertiary: Enrolment: 
 










Enrol 1        
Gov Spend 0.3418 1       
Current Ter 
Spend 
0.1432 0.0992 1      
GNI 0.1162 -0.1585 -0.0793 1     
Pop Age -0.747 -0.1971 -0.0389 -0.0014 1    
Child 
Mortality 
-0.6869 -0.2426 -0.0264 -0.0555 0.831 1   
Urban -0.0825 -0.0911 0.0493 0.1486 -0.0677 -0.068 1  
Share Ter 
Spend 
0.3842 0.3234 -0.0693 -0.1763 -0.3146 -0.2591 -0.0821 1 
Source: Own calculations using the World Development Indicators databank 
 
The way that these matrices can be understood; the number shows the amount to which the 
variable at the top of the column is correlated with the variable in that row. So for primary 
education, in Table 1, it is clear that the correlation between the government expenditure 
variables and the enrolment rate is weak. The strongest correlate of primary enrolment rates 
is the child mortality rate. 
In Table 2, the correlation coefficient of -0.67 indicates that the share of primary education 
spending to total government expenditure on education is relatively strongly, but negatively 
correlated with persistence. This appears to be an odd and unexpected correlation. One way 
to explain this is due to the millennial developmental goals, government spending has been 
focused on enrolment rates. The second of the Millennium Development Goals, adopted after 
the Millennium Summit of the United Nations in 2000, is to achieve universal primary 
education. The government expenditure data reflects a drive by most countries to meet this 
goal. However, rising enrolment rates do not automatically translate into improved 
persistence and reduced repeater rates. In fact, there is some evidence of the opposite pattern 
form the descriptive trends presented below.  This type of focus may produce undesirable 
side effects, such as overcrowded schools, which will have a negative effect on persistence. 
Similarly, children who may not have the necessary resources and family support to persist 
through school will be enrolled in school due to this focus.  
It is also interesting to note that the relationship between the three government expenditure 
variables is weak and may be negative. For example, the correlation between the share of 
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primary education spending out of the education budget and the proportion of the total budget 
allocated to education is about -0.28.  There is a similar relationship with repeater rates, as 
seen in Table 3. If a child does not have the resources or support needed to pass, they will 
repeat. The strongest correlates to persistence and repeater rates are population age and child 
mortality. These variables are negatively correlated with persistence rates, as expected. This 
is likely to reflect that overcrowding in schools and lack of nutrition have a negative effect on 
persistence rates.  
Conversely, these variables are positively correlated with repeater rates, as expected. For 
secondary education, in Table 4, all of the government spending variables do not have much 
effect on enrolment, as was also seen with primary schooling. The population age and child 
mortality rates have the strongest correlations with secondary enrolment rates. In Tables 5 & 
6, the expected correlation between government spending variables and persistence and 
repeater rates is observed; the government expenditure variables are positively correlated 
with persistence and negatively correlated with repeater rates. Once again, the strongest 
correlates of persistence and repeater rates, as is the case with primary schooling, are 
population age and child mortality rates, with the expected direction of correlation for both. 
In Table 7, the government spending variables have more of an effect on tertiary education 
outcomes when compared with primary and secondary education. The correlations are also in 
the expected direction, unlike some of the correlations between government expenditure and 
primary and secondary educational outcomes. . In a similar way to primary and secondary 
schooling, however, it is notable that, the variables with the strongest correlations with 
educational outcomes are population age and child mortality. 
5.4.2) Graphs 
This subsection aims to explore the variables used in the data analysis using descriptive 
methods. The educational outcome variables have been described in terms of average (mean), 
maximum (Max) and minimum (Min) over all countries for which data is available, for each 
year. The government expenditure variables have been described in the same way. These 
descriptive statistics have been presented in graphs so that one can observe the trends of the 




5.4.2.1) Primary schooling 
The government expenditure variable used in Figure 5.1 measures the share of expenditure on 
primary education of total education expenditure. The average appears to remain relatively 
unchanged over time at just below 40%. The minimum is less than 20% and the maximum 
fluctuates around 70%. These minimum and maximum values show the importance of 
primary education according to spending where some countries will spend up to 70% of their 
total expenditure on education on primary, whereas other countries spend relatively little. 
Figure 5.1: Total Government Spending on Primary Education 
 
Source: Own calculations using the World Development Indicators databank 
Figure 5.2: Total Primary Enrolment Rate 
 




































































































































































































In Figure 5.2; the enrolment rate is the number of children who are enrolled in a given year, 
divided by the number of individuals who are the official age to attend primary school. The 
average primary enrolment rate increases steadily over the years to attain an average of over 
100%; with maximum values that fluctuate around 140%. These high maximum enrolment 
rates could be explained by the way the enrolment rate is measured. There are many 
individuals that are older than the official primary school age who are enrolled in primary 
education, especially after 2000. The minimum enrolment rates have been steadily increasing 
as well – from about 20% of the official primary school aged population enrolling to almost 
half of the primary school aged population. This show some progress towards the 
developmental objectives of the United Nations, as set out in the Millennium Development 
Goals, the second one of which is stated as: “achieve universal primary education” (UN, 
2014, 16). 
 
Figure 5.3: Total Primary Persistence Rate 
 
Source: Own calculations using the World Development Indicators databank 
 
In Figure 5.3 above; average persistence rates have been high, rising from just below 60% to 
remain over 80% in the first decade of the twenty-first century. As seen in Figure 5.4 below; 




































































































Figure 5.4: Total Primary Repeater Rate 
 
Source: Own calculations using the World Development Indicators databank 
Figure 5.5: Government Spending on Primary for Advanced & Developing Countries 
 
Source: Own calculations using the World Development Indicators databank 
In Figure 5.5, above the shades of red represent advanced countries the shades of purple 
represent developing countries. The average expenditure on primary education, measured as 
the share of total public expenditure on education that is allocated to primary education, is 
higher in developing countries than it is in advanced countries, showing developing 
countries’ shift in focus from other objectives. Similarly, both the minimum and maximum 








































































































































































































Figure 5.6: Primary Enrolment Rate: Advanced and Developing Countries 
 
Source: Own calculations using the World Development Indicators databank 
In Figure 5.6, above; the average enrolment rates in developed countries are high at around 
100%. The maximum values are also very high. The fluctuations in the maximum and 
minimum values could be explained by conditions in the economy as well as lagged effects 
from policy and changes in government spending. While there are no large differences in the 
average enrolment rates between the two, developing countries have a much wider within-
group variation, with the range of enrolment rates decreasing only slightly over time. 
 
Figure 5.7: Primary Persistence Rate: Advanced and Developing Countries 
 









































































































































































































The average rates of persistence for developed countries in Figure 5.7 above are high, but 
settle marginally below 100%, after rising from 78% in the beginning of the period to a high 
of 91%. The average rates of persistence for developing countries are remain consistently 
below those for advanced  countries, however  the minimum rates much lower than in 
advanced countries. Here too, developing countries’ performance is varies substantially from 
country to country and narrows only slightly over the period. 
In Figure 5.8, seen below, the average primary repeater rate for advanced countries is 
consistently below that for the developing group. . Even for less advanced nations, the 
average rates of repeaters are relatively low, falling to below than 10% over the years. The 
maximums values for developing countries remain disturbingly high, but show some decline 
to settle below 35% in recent years. 
Figure 5.8: Primary Repeater Rates: Advanced and Developing Countries 
 
Source: Own calculations using the World Development Indicators databank 
 
5.4.2.2) Secondary 
In Figure 5.9, below, as seen with primary education expenditure, the average appears to 
remain constant at just below 40%. The minimum share falls steeply to below 20% in the 








































































































Figure 5.9: Government Spending on Secondary Education as a Share of Education Spending 
 
Source: Own calculations using the World Development Indicators databank 
The average enrolment rates, shown in Figure 5.10 below, are low when compared with 
primary. The minimums are relatively small; remaining at below 20% over the entire period. 
This is substantially lower small compared with primary enrolment rates. 
Figure 5.10: Total Secondary Enrolment Rates 
 







































































































































































































Figure 5.11: Total Secondary Persistence Rates 
 
Source: Own calculations using the World Development Indicators databank 
In Figure 5.11, above, persistence rates are, on average, similar in the 80s and towards the 
end of the period. On average are higher in primary than they are in secondary education. 
Total persistence rates in secondary school raise about twenty percentage points. In Figure 
5.12, below, the average repeater rates have been steadily decreasing since 1990, approaching 
5% by 2010. The maximum repeater rates are similar to those in primary education. The 
minimum repeater rate, similarly to primary education, is a low of zero. 
Figure 5.12: Total Secondary Repeater 
 



































































































































































































In Figure 5.13, below, the average expenditure on secondary is higher in advanced countries 
than it is in developing countries, which is opposite to the pattern observed with primary 
education expenditure. Maximum and minimum expenditure shares are relatively the same in 
developing counties, with large fluctuations due to changes in policy and spending. 
Figure 5.13: Government Spending on Secondary Education as a Share of Total Education 
Spending: Advanced and Developing Countries 
 
Source: Own calculations using the World Development Indicators databank 
Figure 5.14: Secondary Enrolment Rate: Advanced and Developing Countries 
 









































































































































































































In Figure 5.14, above, the average enrolment rates in developed countries rise to above 100% 
in the early part of the period and remain relatively steady afterwards. . The average 
enrolment rate for developing countries is never higher than 80%, which is lower than 
primary education; even the maximum is much lower than for primary education.  
Figure 5.15: Secondary Persistence Rate: Advanced and Developing Countries 
 
Source: Own calculations using the World Development Indicators databank 
In Figure 5.15, above; the mean persistence rate in advanced countries stays below 100%.  
The average persistence rate in secondary is similar to that of primary education. The 
persistence rate in developing countries is consistently lower than that for the advanced 
group, remaining below 90%, but the gap narrows gradually over time. 
Figure 5.16: Secondary Repeater Rates: Advanced and Developing Countries 
 









































































































































































































In Figure 5.16 above, the average repeater rate in developed countries stays below 5% for 
most of the period, which is low even when compared with primary schooling. The 
maximums are similar to those for primary education. The average repeater rate for 
developing countries decreases gradually over time. However, the maximum values for 
developing countries remain stubbornly high and substantially above what is seen in 
developed countries. 
5.4.2.3) Tertiary education 
There is only one educational outcome on this level of education namely enrolment rates. 
This is due to limited data. There is neither a persistence rate nor a repeater rate available to 
tertiary education. In Figure 5.17 below, unlike primary and secondary expenditure, the 
average is rather low at about 20%, with high maximums, fluctuating around 40% and low 
minimums, lower than 10%. There was a large increase in spending after 1992. The tertiary 
enrolment rate, shown in Figure 5.18 below, is measured by dividing total enrolment in 
tertiary education by the proportion of the population that is the official tertiary enrolment 
age, 15 to 65 years old. The average enrolment rate rises gradually from about 20% to just 
below 40% by 2010, reflecting a strong global trend of increasing demand for tertiary 
education, as the youth unemployment in many countries has been rising. The minimums are 
very low, and the maximums are high steadily increasing to a peak above 100% and then 
decreasing slightly. 


































































































Source: Own calculations using the World Development Indicators databank 
 
Figure 5.18: Total Tertiary Enrolment Rate 
 
Source: Own calculations using the World Development Indicators databank 
 
Similarly to secondary education, Figure 5.19, below shows that the average expenditure on 
tertiary education is higher in advanced countries than it is in developing, but not by much. 
There are similar maximums, with large fluctuations.  Here again, the range for developing 
countries is much larger, reflecting a diverse group of countries with varying educational 
priorities.   
Figure 5.19: Government Spending on Tertiary Education as a Share of Total Education 




































































































































































































Source: Own calculations using the World Development Indicators databank 
 
Figure 5.20: Tertiary Enrolment Rates: Advanced and Developing Countries 
 
Source: Own calculations using the World Development Indicators databank 
 
In Figure 5.20, above, the average enrolment rate in advanced countries increases through the 
two decades from below 40% to above 60%. In developing countries, a similar trend occurs, 
with the average rate rising from below 20% to less than 40%. The gap between the 
enrolment rates between developing and advanced countries has not shrunk over the period. 
5.5) Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has defined the variables to be used in the data analysis. The descriptive analysis 
and trends shown for the dependent variables and one of the government expenditure 
variables for every level of education serve as the background for the regression analysis 
















































































































FE Enrol FE Persist FE Repeat IV Enrol IV Persist IV Repeat 
Gov Spend on 
Educ 
-0.031 0.450*** -0.165 1.876** -0.652 -0.13 1.744*** -0.604* -0.096 
 -0.252 -0.166 -0.117 -0.758 -0.511 -0.222 -0.331 -0.359 -0.105 
Gov Spend on 
Prim (amnt) 
0.169* -0.039 0.019 -0.005 -0.03 -0.004 0.029 -0.021 0.008 
 -0.094 -0.084 -0.041 -0.064 -0.056 -0.017 -0.04 -0.048 -0.014 
GNI 0 0.000*** -0.000*** 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pop Age 0.386*** -0.530*** 0.303*** 0.683 -0.215 0.23 0.448** -0.197 0.199*** 
 -0.138 -0.112 -0.047 -0.515 -0.312 -0.143 -0.226 -0.243 -0.07 
Child 
Mortality 
-0.183*** -0.181*** 0.072*** -0.477** 0.028 0.031 -0.485*** 0.045 0.035** 
 -0.03 -0.029 -0.014 -0.204 -0.07 -0.059 -0.051 -0.059 -0.016 
Urban -0.001 -0.001 0 0.148 -0.02 0.02 0.130*** -0.017 0.019*** 
 -0.002 -0.001 0 -0.109 -0.038 -0.017 -0.027 -0.031 -0.006 
Gov Spend on 
Prim (share) 
0.176* -0.129** -0.074** 0.192 -0.154 0.032 0.506*** -0.137 0.116** 
 -0.094 -0.064 -0.03 -0.122 -0.11 -0.049 -0.143 -0.171 -0.047 
Constant 77.740*** 112.167*** -3.231 61.193** 106.934*** -5.279 57.163*** 104.033*** -8.510*** 
 -9.007 -7.903 -3.878 -30.657 -12.42 -5.367 -9.861 -11.079 -3.155 
Observations 613 416 520 613 416 520 602 409 511 
Model Fit 0.1713886 0.7391495 0.5871829 0.3894671 0.0321271 0.0917928 0.0188 0.0165 0.0663 
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FE Enrol FE Persist FE Repeat IV Enrol IV Persist IV Repeat 
Gov Spend on 
Educ 
-0.475** -0.379** -0.147*** 2.101*** -0.627*** -0.144 2.115*** -0.668** -0.141*** 
 -0.195 -0.149 -0.043 -0.67 -0.215 -0.1 -0.346 -0.27 -0.047 
Gov Spend on 
Prim (amnt) 
0.325*** -0.008 -0.003 0.205 0.014 -0.02 0.212*** 0.005 -0.017** 
 -0.082 -0.032 -0.019 -0.143 -0.031 -0.013 -0.059 -0.044 -0.009 
GNI -0.000*** 0 -0.000*** 0 -0.000** 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pop Age -0.299*** 0.096* -0.01 -0.175 -0.364 0.004 -0.206 -0.262 -0.013 
 -0.102 -0.051 -0.024 -0.454 -0.241 -0.074 -0.273 -0.237 -0.04 
Child 
Mortality 
-0.274*** -0.199*** 0.141*** 0.14 0.345* 0.014 0.178 0.218 0.04 
 -0.101 -0.044 -0.022 -0.444 -0.188 -0.07 -0.254 -0.229 -0.044 
Urban -0.001 -0.000* 0 -0.049*** -0.014 -0.001 -0.050*** -0.011 -0.001 
 -0.002 0 0 -0.016 -0.009 -0.002 -0.019 -0.013 -0.002 
Gov Spend on 
Prim (share) 
0.313*** 0.004 -0.002 0.661*** -0.136* 0.029** 0.702*** -0.222** 0.047** 
 -0.057 -0.03 -0.012 -0.153 -0.072 -0.013 -0.145 -0.101 -0.021 
Constant 75.298*** 100.467*** 1.529 65.944*** 111.293*** 2.954* 64.669*** 112.908*** 2.421* 
 -8.296 -3.105 -1.832 -21.949 -5.728 -1.638 -8.646 -6.105 -1.242 
Observations 291 160 221 291 160 221 291 160 221 
Model fit 0.2637214 0.1710456 0.2865495 0.2564606 0.1281573 0.1307131 0.0116 0.0075 0.0008 
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FE Enrol FE Persist FE Repeat IV Enrol IV Persist IV Repeat 
Gov Spend on 
Educ 
0.342 0.311 -0.067 1.942** -0.697 -0.158 1.688*** -0.652 -0.128 
 -0.311 -0.198 -0.151 -0.795 -0.606 -0.238 -0.463 -0.515 -0.15 
Gov Spend on 
Prim (amnt) 
0.137 -0.049 0.011 0.035 -0.04 0.008 0.058 -0.033 0.012 
 -0.109 -0.098 -0.046 -0.067 -0.061 -0.016 -0.052 -0.066 -0.02 
GNI 0 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** 0 0 -0.000* 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pop Age 0.471*** -0.604*** 0.308*** 0.628 -0.335 0.375* 0.209 -0.292 0.363*** 
 -0.179 -0.14 -0.055 -0.707 -0.494 -0.216 -0.381 -0.442 -0.124 
Child 
Mortality 
-0.204*** -0.161*** 0.066*** -0.188 0.012 0.093* -0.190** 0.029 0.094*** 
 -0.031 -0.031 -0.015 -0.176 -0.099 -0.049 -0.078 -0.095 -0.026 
Urban -0.001 -0.010*** 0.002 0.461** -0.044 0.110** 0.439*** -0.036 0.108*** 
 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.191 -0.085 -0.049 -0.055 -0.069 -0.019 
Gov Spend on 
Prim (share) 
0.176 -0.144* -0.098** 0.156 -0.133 0.019 0.436** -0.137 0.057 
 -0.131 -0.085 -0.04 -0.144 -0.138 -0.066 -0.215 -0.278 -0.075 
Constant 77.268*** 116.529*** -1.819 13.516 109.102*** -21.396** 17.9 105.162*** -22.877*** 
 -11.16 -9.756 -4.733 -46.684 -22.671 -10.597 -17.163 -18.611 -5.462 
Observations 322 256 299 322 256 299 311 249 290 
Model fit 0.193841 0.671729 0.464944 0.527203 0.032774 0.205581 0.0010 0.1073 0.0582 
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 OLS Enrol OLS Persist OLS 
Repeat 
FE Enrol FE Persist FE Repeat IV Enrol IV Persist IV Repeat 
Gov Spend on 
Educ 
1.007** 0.644*** 0.05 0.891 -0.305 0.054 0.936 -0.192 0.061 
 -0.416 -0.159 -0.122 -0.793 -0.245 -0.147 -0.571 -0.341 -0.104 
Gov Spend on 
Sec (amnt) 
0.241*** -0.076* -0.101*** 0.133 -0.014 -0.021 0.114* -0.002 -0.021 
 -0.066 -0.045 -0.026 -0.137 -0.06 -0.022 -0.065 -0.051 -0.013 
GNI -0.000** 0 -0.000*** 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pop Age -1.186*** -0.500*** 0.247*** -0.798 -0.579** -0.056 -0.758** -0.660*** -0.061 
 -0.13 -0.083 -0.051 -0.773 -0.268 -0.115 -0.361 -0.23 -0.064 
Child 
Mortality 
-0.371*** -0.150*** 0.071*** -0.306*** -0.055 -0.007 -0.309*** -0.048 -0.007 
 -0.032 -0.023 -0.012 -0.112 -0.058 -0.037 -0.095 -0.05 -0.015 
Urban -0.002 -0.001 0 -0.015 -0.053** -0.001 -0.01 -0.054* -0.001 
 -0.003 -0.001 0 -0.071 -0.021 -0.005 -0.045 -0.028 -0.005 
Gov Spend on 
Sec (share) 
-0.220** 0.130* 0.130*** 0.075 0.016 0.032 0.056 0.133 0.039 
 -0.09 -0.073 -0.035 -0.146 -0.075 -0.042 -0.246 -0.178 -0.04 
Constant 108.351*** 106.904*** 1.38 98.936** 118.886*** 7.272 99.350*** 115.433*** 7.135** 
 -9.102 -6.623 -3.631 -38.408 -14.713 -5.38 -16.923 -13.97 -2.829 
Observations 601 368 444 601 368 444 581 354 437 
Model fit 0.726723 0.7511466 0.5235631 0.0842648 0.0448032 0.0195312 0.7184 0.0734 0.2188 
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 OLS Enrol OLS 
Persist 
OLS Repeat FE Enrol FE 
Persist 
FE Repeat IV Enrol IV Persist IV Repeat 
Gov Spend on 
Educ 
3.481*** -0.238* -0.229** 4.071* -0.11 -0.32 3.771*** -0.106 -0.324*** 
 -0.63 -0.129 -0.113 -2.108 -0.177 -0.201 -1.29 -0.24 -0.104 
Gov Spend on 
Sec (amnt) 
0.358 -0.043 -0.203*** 1.024 0.084 -0.036 1.112*** 0.083 -0.035 
 -0.269 -0.029 -0.045 -0.71 -0.057 -0.028 -0.257 -0.058 -0.023 
GNI -0.000*** 0 -0.000*** 0 0 0 -0.000* 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pop Age -0.453** 0.036 -0.105 2.09 -0.068 0.061 1.826* -0.065 0.055 
 -0.228 -0.039 -0.065 -2.084 -0.253 -0.155 -0.965 -0.225 -0.082 
Child 
Mortality 
-1.020*** -0.445*** -0.123** -2.219 -0.333 -0.281 -1.358 -0.341 -0.260*** 
 -0.202 -0.071 -0.048 -1.414 -0.277 -0.177 -0.932 -0.232 -0.078 
Urban -0.003 0 -0.000** 0.008 -0.019* -0.001 0.023 -0.019 -0.001 
 -0.004 0 0 -0.112 -0.01 -0.004 -0.069 -0.013 -0.003 
Gov Spend on 
Sec (share) 
-0.537*** 0 -0.069 -0.081 0.05 0.003 -0.737** 0.056 -0.014 
 -0.108 -0.023 -0.042 -0.228 -0.073 -0.034 -0.364 -0.11 -0.026 
Constant 91.092*** 105.701*** 28.169*** -29.062 96.629*** 8.122 -10.922 96.463*** 8.675*** 
 -24.501 -2.873 -4.587 -103.789 -3.915 -5.118 -34.315 -8.105 -2.953 
N 297 143 193 297 143 193 289 141 192 
Model fit 0.2552367 0.2437267 0.2193931 0.1227361 0.0675854 0.1967045 0.0779 0.0001 0.0727 
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 OLS Enrol OLS 
Persist 
OLS Repeat FE Enrol FE Persist FE Repeat IV Enrol IV Persist IV Repeat 
Gov Spend on 
Educ 
-0.811*** 0.409* 0.127 -0.191 -0.345 0.257 -0.114 -0.179 0.249 
 -0.307 -0.22 -0.153 -0.347 -0.269 -0.172 -0.418 -0.53 -0.18 
Gov Spend on 
Sec (amnt) 
0.222*** -0.110** -0.087*** -0.025 -0.026 -0.012 -0.044 -0.009 -0.013 
 -0.063 -0.048 -0.029 -0.085 -0.069 -0.021 -0.041 -0.078 -0.019 
GNI 0 0 -0.000*** 0 0 0 -0.000* 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pop Age -1.185*** -0.791*** 0.265*** -1.850*** -0.647** 0.056 -2.064*** -0.741** 0.053 
 -0.148 -0.128 -0.056 -0.539 -0.315 -0.119 -0.242 -0.336 -0.106 
Child 
Mortality 
-0.313*** -0.110*** 0.068*** -0.221** -0.085 0.003 -0.205*** -0.081 0.005 
 -0.032 -0.027 -0.013 -0.094 -0.078 -0.04 -0.061 -0.082 -0.022 
Urban -0.001 -0.014*** -0.006*** -0.035 -0.094** 0.019 -0.022 -0.097 0.02 
 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.062 -0.041 -0.028 -0.042 -0.061 -0.02 
Gov Spend on 
Sec (share) 
-0.059 0.176** 0.246*** 0.031 -0.009 0.089** 0.128 0.143 0.078 
 -0.111 -0.087 -0.051 -0.194 -0.092 -0.042 -0.222 -0.285 -0.085 
Constant 108.264*** 119.248*** -3.353 146.501*** 127.460*** -0.141 148.434*** 123.170*** 0.327 
 -10.398 -8.441 -4.337 -26.353 -19.151 -6.424 -15.197 -23.776 -6.173 
N 304 225 251 304 225 251 292 213 245 
Model fit 0.7553761 0.7016096 0.5099074 0.4161922 0.0538572 0.053728 0.7015 0.1820 0.0090 
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 Total Advanced Developing 
 OLS FE IV OLS FE IV OLS FE IV 
Gov Spend on 
Educ 
2.136*** 3.754** 4.306*** 2.056** 2.046* 2.003*** 1.761*** 4.329*** 5.496*** 
 -0.462 -1.461 -0.561 -0.86 -1.032 -0.777 -0.655 -1.633 -0.798 
Gov Spend on 
Ter (amnt) 
0.366*** 0.160* 0.204*** 0.441*** 0.118 0.230** 0.260*** 0.144* 0.189*** 
 -0.066 -0.081 -0.054 -0.142 -0.14 -0.092 -0.074 -0.078 -0.069 
GNI 0.000*** 0.000* 0 0.000*** 0 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pop Age -1.429*** -4.474*** -4.407*** -0.791*** -1.839 -1.848*** -1.409*** -3.746*** -3.902*** 
 -0.105 -0.62 -0.389 -0.28 -1.204 -0.634 -0.107 -0.725 -0.557 
Child 
Mortality 
-0.116*** 0.24 0.231** -0.134 -4.036** -3.466*** -0.082*** 0.17 0.063 
 -0.034 -0.15 -0.091 -0.361 -1.683 -0.484 -0.029 -0.153 -0.13 
Urban -0.017*** -0.069 -0.076* -0.027*** 0.005 0.026 -0.002 -0.14 -0.284*** 
 -0.002 -0.1 -0.043 -0.002 -0.079 -0.04 -0.004 -0.097 -0.096 
Gov Spend on 
Ter (share) 
0.594*** 0.696** 0.613** 0.897*** 0.453* 0.471* 0.275** 0.808* 0.493 
 -0.093 -0.315 -0.24 -0.18 -0.251 -0.276 -0.109 -0.439 -0.364 
Constant 28.422*** 107.928*** 103.471*** 7.684 81.263** 63.390*** 39.626*** 104.849*** 132.329*** 
 -7.165 -27.735 -15.717 -12.829 -29.738 -19.227 -9.732 -34.223 -27.584 
N 598 598 514 293 293 273 305 305 241 
Model fit 0.6762836 0.5425242 0.5947 0.3793638 0.6269842 0.0077 0.6843862 0.6016081 0.2375 
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6.2) Results: Without Lagged Effects 
6.2.1) Primary 
In table 6.1; in the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model; enrolment is negatively correlated 
with total public spending on education. A relationship like this is not expected. However; 
this relationship is insignificant. With persistence; if expenditure on education, measured as a 
percentage of GDP, increases by 1 % then the rate to which pupils persist to the end of 
primary increases by 45 %, ceteris paribus. The repeater rate is negatively correlated with 
public spending, as expected but is insignificant. In the Fixed Effects (FE) & Instrumented 
Variables (IV) models; the enrolment and repeater rates have the expected direction of 
correlation reflected in the expected signs. Enrolment is significant in both. However; 
persistence is negatively correlated with public spending which is not what one would expect. 
Current spending on primary is just another measure of the previously discussed government 
expenditure variable. The difference in measure is that it measures the amount of government 
spending on a particular level of education; in this case it measures the amount of expenditure 
on primary education, in local currency units. In the OLS model; enrolment is the expected 
sign but both the persistence and repeater rates are the incorrect and unexpected signs. In the 
FE & IV models; enrolment, persistence and repeater rates all have the expected correlation 
in some cases and then in other cases, the correlation is unexpected. But these variables are 
insignificant. And these incorrect correlations have already been observed in the previous 
chapter during the descriptive statistics. 
Gross National Income (GNI), per capita, has a value of zero for all the regressions. This 
means that the influence of this variable is very small, very close to zero. Although being 
such a small value; it is still a very significant influence in some of the models. Thus; it does 
have an effect, even if it is extremely little. For the cases where it is significant; an increase in 
income has a positive effect on persistence. So as income for an individual increases, the rate 
of persistence will increase since they will have more money to be able to stay in school. One 
would expect repeater rates to be negatively correlated with income; since as incomes 
increase, individuals will have more money available for extra tuition and extra books if the 
child is struggling to pass. For negative correlations between income and enrolment or 
persistence rates; one could interpret this as public schooling being an inferior good; so as 
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incomes increase; the individual will enrol at a private school and drop out of public 
schooling. 
The population age variable captures the affect that the age of the population has on the 
various educational outcome variables. This can be understood as the more of the population 
that is a certain age; the higher the educational outcomes are going to be for the level of 
education that is appropriate for that age. So if a country has a young population, then the 
most of the population will be the age to attend primary. The variable used in all of the 
models, secondary & tertiary included, is the population that is the official age for primary 
school. So one would expect it to be positively correlation with primary and negatively 
correlated with tertiary. In this case; it is positively correlated with primary enrolment rates, 
and significantly so. But due to overcrowding in schools; persistence and repeater rates are 
negatively affected. 
Child Mortality rates are the largest, most significant contributor to educational outcomes; 
decreasing enrolment and persistence rates, whilst increasing repeater rates. There is a 
negative correlation with enrolment, because children will die before they reach enrolment 
age. If child mortality rate increases by 1 %, then the enrolment rate will decrease by 18 %, 
ceteris paribus. To interpret persistence and repeater rates; mortality can be viewed as a proxy 
for nutrition. If children are malnourished, they will not have the energy to be able to perform 
in school so they will not persist and may also have to repeat grades. 
Urbanisation should have a positive effect on educational outcomes through ease of access to 
schools and better infrastructure for schools. It should be noted that this variable is not a 
direct measure of urbanisation. It is an indirect proxy for urbanisation and actually a measure 
of population density, which could be understood as the more densely populated an area is 
the more urbanised it is since rural areas tend to be less populated when compared with an 
urban area. So this variable may be susceptible to measurement error. This variable is 
significant in the IV model; where if the population density increases by 100 people, then the 
enrolment rate will increase by 13 %, ceteris paribus. 
For share of public expenditure on primary education; in the IV model; which accounts for 
circular causality; a 1 % increase in the share of public expenditure on primary education 
leads to a 50 % increase in the primary enrolment rate, ceteris paribus. This variable is 
negatively correlated with persistence which is not expected. But looking at the number of 
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observations; the persistence model has the least amount of observations available for the 
regression and so inaccuracy due to limited data availability is expected. 
Looking at the overall model fit; the R- squared value is very low except for 73 % and 58 % 
in the OLS models. So in the OLS model for persistence; 73 % of the variation in the 
persistence rate can be explained by the model presented here. 
In tables 6.2 & 6.3; comparing advanced and developing countries; total public expenditure 
on education appears to have more of an effect on educational outcomes in advanced 
countries than it does in developing. This could be explained by the fact that governments in 
advanced countries produce larger amounts gross domestic production (GDP) and since this 
variable is measured as a % of GDP, then advanced countries will have larger values of this 
variable. Governments in advanced countries also have more money and resources available 
to be able to spend and so total public expenditure on education appears to have more of an 
effect on educational outcomes in advanced countries than it does in developing. Population 
density and urbanisation seems to have more of a significant affect in developing countries 
since they tend to have larger population and not as much infrastructure when compared to 
advanced countries. 
6.2.2) Secondary 
In table 6.4; public spending on education in OLS model is significant. It is positively 
correlated with enrolment and persistence rates, as expected. However; it is also positively 
correlated with repeater rates, which is not as expected but insignificant. In secondary 
education; if total public expenditure on education increases by 1 % then the persistence rate 
increases by 64 %, ceteris paribus. The current spending on level of education variable is 
more significant in secondary than it is in primary. This could be interpreted as governments 
spending more effectively on secondary than on primary education. 
Similarly to primary; GNI has a small but significant effect on educational outcomes. The 
population age variable still represents the amount of the population that is primary school 
aged. In other words; if the population is young then there would be more children available 
to enrol in primary and less to enrol in secondary and so one would expect this variable to be 
negatively correlated with secondary educational outcomes. And this variable is negatively 
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correlated with educational outcomes for secondary education as expected. This variable is 
also fairly significant across all of the models. 
Urbanisation has the same effect on secondary as it does in primary. In the FE & IV models; 
increases in population density significantly decreases persistence rates. Child mortality is 
significant, same as primary. Thus the more children under the age of five die and the worse 
nutrition levels are for children, the lower educational outcomes will be. If children die when 
they are young then they will not live long enough to enrol and persist through to secondary. 
This will be reflected in low secondary enrolment rates, with a decrease in persistence rates 
due to malnutrition and higher repeater rates due to poor performance from lack of food. 
Similar to primary; share of spending per level of education is significant. In this case; it is 
spending on secondary and not primary. The correlations with this variable and the 
educational outcome variables are as expected except for repeater rates. But like persistence 
rates; repeater rates are also difficult to measure. Unlike enrolment; persistence takes time to 
measure as well as with repeater rates. Since it occurs over time; one would expect it to be 
affected by lagged effects and hence lags have been included, to further analyse the data, in 
the next subsection of this results section. 
Overall, the OLS models are well defined, with R squared values all above 50 %. The other 
models are, however, poorly specified. 
In tables 6.5 & 6.6; one can compare advanced and developing countries as was done in 
primary only now it is done for secondary. In advanced countries; government spending has a 
large, significant, positive effect on enrolment when compared to developing countries. 
Similar to what was seen in primary education; this can be explained by the fact that 
governments in advanced countries have more resources available than governments in 
developing countries. 
Persistence is negatively correlated with government spending throughout these results. One 
way that it can be explained is due to the push towards large scale enrolment across the world 
as stated by the Millennial Developmental Goals (MDG), as discussed in previous chapters. 
If enrolment is pushed to be increased, children may not have the ability or the resources to 
continue through school even if they have been enrolled. Enrolment does not reflect effort or 
ability. A child can only persist if they have the ability and the support structure. At home, for 
example, if a child has been enrolled in school but they do not have the books, stationary or 
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help at home to assist them in completing the level of schooling that they are enrolled in. 
They may need to repeat if they are lacking in ability. They may also not persist through to 
completion. So increases in spending will push towards enrolment, as stated by the MDGs, 
which will have a negative effect on persistence and repeater rates and hence the unexpected 
correlation is explained. 
Population age has more of a significant effect in developing than in advanced. This could be 
a reflection on the type of population in developing countries. They have high birth rates thus 
they would have young populations. This is also seen in primary for developing countries. 
Similarly to primary again; urbanisation is also less significant in advanced countries. 
6.2.3) Tertiary 
With primary & secondary education; there seemed to not be much fixed correlation between 
government spending, in all measures, and educational outcomes, in all the models. In some 
cases, the government spending variables had the correct, expected signs, and in other cases 
and they had an unexpected sign. Sometimes, they were significant and sometimes they were 
insignificant. There were a few odd correlations; such as a negative correlation between 
enrolment or persistence rates and government expenditure, and a positive correlation 
between repeater rates and government expenditure.  
It gave rise to this random pattern and this idea that the link between government spending 
and educational outcomes is not a “one size fits all” process. Thus; governments cannot 
simply “through money at a problem” to fix it. In other words; spending on education for the 
sake of spending on education does not guarantee results. One can conclude that in terms of 
lower levels of education, in the light of the data analysis presented here, government 
expenditure on education is ineffective. Simply put; in some cases it delivers results and in 
other cases, it does not. And it is fairly random when it comes to which cases it is effective 
and when it is not. 
But it is not the same case when it comes to tertiary education. In table 6.7; for tertiary 
education; all of the government spending variables are positive and significant. There are 
only enrolment variables. So in all cases; as government expenditure increases; tertiary 
enrolment rates increase. Same as primary and secondary; GNI has a small but significant 
effect on enrolment rates. The more income individuals have, the more inclined they are to be 
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able to afford to study at a tertiary level. Child mortality is also significant, same as in 
primary and secondary. If a child suffers from malnutrition as it grows up, the more chances 
that they will be unable to reach tertiary education since they will struggle to think 
throughout their primary and secondary years of education.  
The population age variable shows the correlation that one would expect. Seeing as this 
variable captures the effects of a young population, it has a negative effect on tertiary 
education. Since this is at a tertiary level of education; individuals may have children. This 
negative correlation could reflect the fact that adults forgo their own education for the sake of 
educating their children or bringing up children. Either this is a time factor; where parents 
cannot spend time in tertiary classes since they need to be at home and caring for children. Or 
this could be a money factor; where parents either have to spend the money that they would 
spend on pursuing their own education on their children’s education or not on their children’s 
education but on other items needed to raise their children; food, clothes, etc. 
With high R squared values, one can see that these models, OLS, FE & IV, are well specified 
and significant representation of what affects tertiary enrolment rates, overall and in 
developing and advanced countries separately. 
6.2.4) Concluding remarks: 
From the data analysis; one can see a few key aspects. Firstly; child mortality rates affect all 
levels of education. The age of the population is important. Income also has a small but 
significant effect on educational outcomes. Urbanisation does not have as much of a 
significant affect as one would expect it to have on educational outcomes. There are also very 
low model fit for the IV models, except for the enrolment models. Government spending is 
also not as significant in primary and secondary education. But in tertiary education, 
government expenditure is very significant. This implies that government expenditure on 
primary and secondary is ineffective since it does not matter if governments spend or not. But 
government expenditure on high education is very effective.  There was also a problem with 
unexpected correlations and so the next subsection presents results that include lags in an 





Table 6.8: Primary: Total: 
 FE Enrol FE Persist FE Repeat IV Enrol IV Persist IV Repeat 
Gov Spend 1.351** -0.648 -0.303 1.500*** -0.633 -0.306** 
 -0.564 -0.749 -0.203 -0.328 -0.484 -0.13 
Gov Spend L1 0.028 -0.527 -0.067 0.13 -0.528 -0.069 
 -0.3 -0.353 -0.097 -0.34 -0.517 -0.13 
Gov Spend L2 0.166 -0.078 0.045 0.052 -0.089 0.048 
 -0.348 -0.413 -0.116 -0.305 -0.467 -0.123 
Current Spend 
Prim 
0.187*** 0.061 -0.012 0.192*** 0.062 -0.012 
 -0.058 -0.064 -0.024 -0.04 -0.058 -0.017 
Current Spend 
Prim L1 
0.182*** -0.180* -0.053* 0.195*** -0.180** -0.054** 
 -0.049 -0.093 -0.03 -0.053 -0.081 -0.022 
Current Spend 
Prim L2 
0.086 0.131 0.05 0.087* 0.135** 0.050** 
 -0.063 -0.103 -0.036 -0.047 -0.065 -0.02 
GNI 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pop Age -0.057 -0.512 -0.11 0.035 -0.512 -0.113 
 -0.355 -0.4 -0.141 -0.253 -0.329 -0.103 
Child 
Mortality 
0.198 1.734 0.098 0.207 1.751 0.109 
 -0.685 -2.588 -0.711 -0.858 -2.394 -0.682 
Child 
Mortality L1 
-0.338 -3.637 -1.326 -0.554 -3.641 -1.337 
 -1.426 -4.678 -1.058 -1.656 -4.2 -1.124 
Child 
Mortality L2 
-0.116 2.504 1.477* 0.054 2.493 1.479*** 
 -0.862 -3.236 -0.792 -0.879 -2.104 -0.545 
Urban -0.011 -0.016 0.012 -0.018 -0.017 0.012 
 -0.048 -0.031 -0.02 -0.027 -0.044 -0.013 
Share Spend 
Prim 
0.401*** -0.381 0.012 0.690*** -0.331* 0.007 
 -0.126 -0.268 -0.076 -0.157 -0.198 -0.065 
Share Spend 
Prim L1 
0.121 -0.285 -0.007 -0.068 -0.312* -0.003 
 -0.108 -0.187 -0.068 -0.143 -0.18 -0.06 
Share Spend 
Prim L2 
0.005 0.324 0.032 -0.004 0.314* 0.032 
 -0.108 -0.207 -0.059 -0.112 -0.186 -0.047 
Constant 45.520** 111.280*** 0.428 39.860*** 110.427*** 0.507 
 -22.29 -15.324 -4.969 -9.662 -14.693 -3.864 
Observations 348 228 290 347 227 289 







Table 6.9: Primary: Advanced: 
 FE Enrol FE Persist FE Repeat IV Enrol IV Persist IV Repeat 
Gov Spend 2.474*** -0.042 -0.031 2.399*** -0.185 -0.017 
 -0.585 -0.369 -0.086 -0.544 -0.465 -0.071 
Gov Spend L1 -1.02 -0.62 -0.136 -0.918 -0.445 -0.155 
 -0.662 -0.593 -0.124 -0.741 -0.546 -0.099 
Gov Spend L2 1.996*** 0.221 -0.047 1.952*** 0.232 -0.04 
 -0.711 -0.528 -0.065 -0.651 -0.503 -0.086 
Current Spend 
Prim 
0.14 0.012 -0.007 0.129 -0.034 -0.005 
 -0.095 -0.052 -0.015 -0.085 -0.079 -0.012 
Current Spend 
Prim L1 
0.085 -0.022 -0.002 0.095 0.014 -0.004 
 -0.105 -0.056 -0.012 -0.096 -0.081 -0.012 
Current Spend 
Prim L2 
0.303 0.154 -0.015 0.301*** 0.166** -0.015 
 -0.18 -0.095 -0.014 -0.093 -0.078 -0.012 
GNI 0 0.000* 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pop Age -0.443 -0.327 -0.069 -0.458 -0.188 -0.069 
 -0.466 -0.217 -0.083 -0.358 -0.379 -0.046 
Child 
Mortality 
0.281 -0.167 -0.024 0.346 0.231 -0.045 
 -2.062 -1.412 -0.313 -2.171 -1.95 -0.278 
Child 
Mortality L1 
0.52 -0.295 0.699 0.384 -1.455 0.737* 
 -2.218 -2.405 -0.495 -3.325 -2.931 -0.415 
Child 
Mortality L2 
-0.985 0.577 -0.576* -0.932 1.023 -0.587*** 
 -1.47 -1.294 -0.298 -1.696 -1.43 -0.206 
Urban -0.039 -0.014 -0.012*** -0.039 -0.014 -0.012*** 
 -0.03 -0.023 -0.003 -0.027 -0.024 -0.004 
Share Spend 
Prim 
0.821*** -0.167 0.028 0.745*** -0.482* 0.041 
 -0.213 -0.133 -0.019 -0.227 -0.252 -0.031 
Share Spend 
Prim L1 
0.148 -0.157 -0.018 0.211 0.074 -0.027 
 -0.145 -0.244 -0.032 -0.245 -0.239 -0.031 
Share Spend 
Prim L2 
-0.369 0.221 0.041* -0.364** 0.241 0.040* 
 -0.218 -0.205 -0.02 -0.174 -0.163 -0.022 
Constant 34.71 94.736*** 5.499*** 35.812*** 95.578*** 5.371*** 
 -31.037 -11.711 -1.482 -12.627 -10.114 -1.653 
Observations 226 125 174 226 125 174 







Table 6.10: Primary: Developing: 
 FE Enrol FE Persist FE Repeat IV Enrol IV Persist IV Repeat 
Gov Spend 0.429 -1.162 -0.536* 1.280* -1.235 -1.007*** 
 -0.58 -0.892 -0.292 -0.71 -0.869 -0.375 
Gov Spend L1 -0.164 -0.922 -0.152 0.37 -0.99 -0.496 
 -0.314 -0.576 -0.149 -0.551 -0.851 -0.318 
Gov Spend L2 0.015 0.173 0.068 -0.32 0.269 0.373 
 -0.263 -0.435 -0.195 -0.446 -0.781 -0.294 
Current Spend 
Prim 
0.179*** 0.078 -0.022 0.199*** 0.081 -0.026 
 -0.046 -0.08 -0.035 -0.053 -0.096 -0.038 
Current Spend 
Prim L1 
0.200*** -0.230* -0.077 0.286*** -0.235 -0.125** 
 -0.046 -0.122 -0.05 -0.091 -0.149 -0.056 
Current Spend 
Prim L2 
0.026 0.151 0.086* 0.015 0.139 0.104** 
 -0.045 -0.113 -0.048 -0.064 -0.113 -0.051 
GNI 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pop Age 0.853 0.158 0.171 0.681 0.257 0.016 
 -0.522 -0.865 -0.266 -0.56 -0.898 -0.403 
Child 
Mortality 
0.473 3.162 2.626* 0.381 2.465 3.451 
 -0.494 -5.315 -1.376 -1.078 -5.397 -2.128 
Child 
Mortality L1 
-0.757 -7.933 -5.825** -0.837 -7.084 -6.865* 
 -0.979 -9.977 -2.231 -2.127 -9.586 -3.598 
Child 
Mortality L2 
-0.034 5.229 3.484*** 0.079 5.03 3.751** 
 -0.583 -5.504 -1.101 -1.138 -4.8 -1.751 
Urban 0.016 -0.202 0.03 0.069 -0.244 0.007 
 -0.084 -0.261 -0.043 -0.088 -0.236 -0.064 
Share Spend 
Prim 
-0.175 -1.104* -0.164 0.75 -1.357*** -0.753*** 
 -0.151 -0.558 -0.157 -0.579 -0.423 -0.252 
Share Spend 
Prim L1 
0.081 -0.206 0.04 -0.346 -0.115 0.343** 
 -0.153 -0.228 -0.116 -0.307 -0.323 -0.175 
Share Spend 
Prim L2 
-0.123 -0.168 -0.125 0.251 -0.197 -0.270* 
 -0.106 -0.445 -0.101 -0.299 -0.369 -0.152 
Constant 60.172* 156.807*** 0.335 14.334 168.701*** 27.715 
 -31.05 -33.993 -9.513 -36.833 -54.218 -20.445 
Observations 122 103 116 121 102 115 







Table 6.11: Secondary: Total: 
 FE Enrol FE Persist FE Repeat IV Enrol IV Persist IV Repeat 
Gov Spend 1.700* 0.286 -0.105 1.026 0.213 -0.145 
 -1.004 -0.279 -0.094 -1.014 -0.371 -0.12 
Gov Spend L1 0.167 0.257 -0.231* 0.304 0.15 -0.257* 
 -0.501 -0.265 -0.12 -1.125 -0.427 -0.138 
Gov Spend L2 0.602 -0.329 0.002 0.693 -0.206 0.065 
 -0.987 -0.358 -0.101 -1.002 -0.393 -0.133 
Current Spend 
Sec 
0.021 0.04 0.002 -0.057 0.042 0.004 
 -0.089 -0.047 -0.009 -0.11 -0.041 -0.016 
Current Spend 
Sec L1 
0.112 -0.08 0.035* 0.16 -0.102** 0.028 
 -0.171 -0.063 -0.02 -0.132 -0.051 -0.018 
Current Spend 
Sec L2 
0.205 0.063* -0.021 0.221* 0.08 -0.016 
 -0.197 -0.035 -0.021 -0.122 -0.055 -0.018 
GNI 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pop Age 2.465 -0.277 -0.181 2.593*** -0.282 -0.166** 
 -2.114 -0.241 -0.139 -0.702 -0.283 -0.084 
Child 
Mortality 
-1.368 1.685 -1.480* -2.341 1.503 -1.541*** 
 -1.61 -1.581 -0.748 -2.553 -1.963 -0.592 
Child 
Mortality L1 
3.637 -0.958 1.631 5.383 -0.675 1.780* 
 -3.46 -2.961 -1.236 -4.903 -3.5 -1.032 
Child 
Mortality L2 
-3.258 -0.479 -0.296 -4.012 -0.569 -0.379 
 -2.147 -1.637 -0.608 -2.579 -1.771 -0.514 
Urban 0.007 0.012 -0.027** 0.022 0.009 -0.025** 
 -0.1 -0.02 -0.01 -0.078 -0.031 -0.01 
Share Spend 
Sec 
-0.147 0.529** 0.043 -0.973*** 0.338* -0.018 
 -0.179 -0.249 -0.053 -0.367 -0.177 -0.046 
Share Spend 
Sec L1 
0.06 -0.179 -0.089* 0.568* -0.095 -0.045 
 -0.182 -0.152 -0.045 -0.307 -0.156 -0.041 
Share Spend 
Sec L2 
0.041 -0.049 0.029 0.119 -0.016 0.036 
 -0.21 -0.135 -0.026 -0.229 -0.099 -0.025 
Constant 18.411 81.253*** 14.050* 26.392 84.824*** 13.672*** 
 -90.516 -12.067 -7.229 -27.866 -13.782 -3.354 
Observations 346 196 257 336 190 255 







Table 6.12: Secondary: Advanced: 
 FE Enrol FE Persist FE Repeat IV Enrol IV Persist IV Repeat 
Gov Spend 2.563 0.445 -0.123 2.18 0.419 -0.124 
 -1.563 -0.303 -0.131 -1.784 -0.43 -0.148 
Gov Spend L1 0.122 -0.738 -0.429* -0.787 -0.729 -0.422** 
 -1.457 -0.433 -0.226 -2.386 -0.567 -0.209 
Gov Spend L2 1.28 0.286 0.072 2.937 0.317 0.064 
 -1.878 -0.4 -0.242 -2.224 -0.52 -0.205 
Current 
Spend Sec 
0.278 0.125 -0.013 0.288 0.127 -0.014 
 -0.348 -0.083 -0.026 -0.32 -0.097 -0.032 
Current 
Spend Sec L1 
0.371 -0.029 -0.017 0.119 -0.038 -0.016 
 -0.303 -0.061 -0.019 -0.344 -0.094 -0.034 
Current 
Spend Sec L2 
1.266* 0.148** -0.026 1.576*** 0.166** -0.026 
 -0.682 -0.053 -0.023 -0.31 -0.081 -0.03 
GNI 0 0.000*** 0 -0.000** 0.000* 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pop Age 3.526* -0.242 0.078 3.473*** -0.269 0.079 
 -1.8 -0.401 -0.14 -1.092 -0.405 -0.101 
Child 
Mortality 
-6.762 -1.047 -0.399 -7.724 -1.125 -0.391 
 -6.181 -2.124 -0.453 -7.172 -2.124 -0.668 
Child 
Mortality L1 
9.749 -2.716 0.743 10.283 -2.77 0.735 
 -8.283 -3.442 -0.976 -11.142 -2.929 -1.012 
Child 
Mortality L2 
-5.989 3.500* -0.697 -5.385 3.637** -0.701 
 -5.933 -1.774 -0.557 -5.768 -1.639 -0.51 
Urban -0.109 -0.01 -0.031** -0.105 -0.009 -0.032*** 
 -0.119 -0.013 -0.012 -0.093 -0.028 -0.009 
Share Spend 
Sec 
-0.371 0.121 0 -1.268*** 0.096 0.005 
 -0.322 -0.14 -0.022 -0.467 -0.237 -0.04 
Share Spend 
Sec L1 
0.032 -0.051 -0.039 0.965* -0.006 -0.042 
 -0.381 -0.078 -0.027 -0.526 -0.193 -0.041 
Share Spend 
Sec L2 
0.049 0.056 0.056 -0.234 0.031 0.056* 
 -0.395 -0.107 -0.036 -0.387 -0.133 -0.031 
Constant -100.899 75.503*** 15.577** -99.275** 75.286*** 15.640*** 
 -126.64 -6.289 -6.234 -40.19 -12.186 -4.004 
Observations 226 112 156 220 110 155 







Table 6.13: Secondary: Developing: 
 FE Enrol FE Persist FE Repeat IV Enrol IV Persist IV Repeat 
Gov Spend -0.151 0.218 0.009 -0.637 0.019 0.029 
 -0.343 -0.42 -0.254 -0.481 -0.739 -0.229 
Gov Spend L1 -0.15 0.487 -0.037 -0.23 0.302 -0.027 
 -0.336 -0.344 -0.103 -0.398 -0.768 -0.199 
Gov Spend L2 0.146 -0.383 -0.016 0.025 -0.029 -0.025 
 -0.306 -0.514 -0.158 -0.367 -0.755 -0.183 
Current 
Spend Sec 
0.023 0.055 0.005 -0.028 0.05 0.005 
 -0.034 -0.055 -0.012 -0.044 -0.069 -0.019 
Current 
Spend Sec L1 
-0.086** -0.056 0.055*** -0.091* -0.092 0.057** 
 -0.042 -0.08 -0.02 -0.049 -0.093 -0.024 
Current 
Spend Sec L2 
-0.107** 0.038 -0.003 -0.144*** 0.098 -0.003 
 -0.04 -0.064 -0.024 -0.046 -0.119 -0.026 
GNI 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pop Age -0.853** -0.039 -0.375 -0.890** -0.032 -0.373** 
 -0.378 -0.466 -0.241 -0.387 -0.708 -0.186 
Child 
Mortality 
-0.904* -0.697 -1.056 -0.921 -2.548 -1.019 
 -0.469 -2.145 -1.095 -0.854 -4.678 -1.204 
Child 
Mortality L1 
2.249* 3.866 -0.48 2.376 7.837 -0.589 
 -1.28 -3.804 -1.562 -1.668 -8.589 -2.3 
Child 
Mortality L2 
-1.523* -2.978 1.378** -1.640* -5.091 1.449 
 -0.841 -2.052 -0.606 -0.885 -4.32 -1.197 
Urban -0.044 -0.018 -0.045*** 0.082 -0.09 -0.047 
 -0.058 -0.092 -0.014 -0.069 -0.182 -0.029 
Share Spend 
Sec 
0.230** 0.625* 0.216** -0.317 0.219 0.235* 
 -0.105 -0.339 -0.095 -0.291 -0.357 -0.136 
Share Spend 
Sec L1 
0.002 -0.278 -0.091 0.007 -0.008 -0.099 
 -0.14 -0.262 -0.085 -0.123 -0.355 -0.078 
Share Spend 
Sec L2 
0.049 -0.036 -0.002 0.04 0.071 -0.003 
 -0.086 -0.181 -0.034 -0.097 -0.2 -0.038 
Constant 124.216*** 72.820** 14.119* 138.888*** 82.905* 13.658 
 -18.582 -34.849 -7.842 -22.945 -49.019 -9.127 
Observations 120 84 101 116 80 100 








Table 6.14: Tertiary: All: 
 FE Enrol FE Enrol FE Enrol IV Enrol IV Enrol IV Enrol 
Gov Spend 2.968*** 2.795*** 1.924* 1.596 3.074 2.971 
 -1.033 -0.937 -1.085 -1.09 -1.956 -2.158 
Gov Spend L1 1.498*** 1.108 1.418 2.253 2.026** 1.11 
 -0.509 -0.969 -1.145 -1.462 -0.942 -1.673 
Gov Spend L2 2.137** 2.150** 2.358 1.391 2.344* 2.58 
 -0.823 -0.862 -1.996 -1.373 -1.257 -1.615 
Current Spend 
Tertiary 
0.187 0.216** 0.02 0.078 0.349* 0.332* 
 -0.126 -0.095 -0.1 -0.106 -0.198 -0.196 
Current Spend 
Tertiary L1 
0.056 0.105 -0.013 -0.021 -0.191 -0.123 
 -0.082 -0.107 -0.12 -0.115 -0.155 -0.261 
Current Spend 
Tertiary L2 
-0.073 0.077 0.007 0.129 -0.247 -0.037 
 -0.133 -0.095 -0.17 -0.108 -0.176 -0.203 
GNI 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pop Age -5.275*** -4.312*** -2.991* -3.751*** -6.245*** -5.002** 
 -1.105 -0.829 -1.678 -0.827 -1.338 -2.09 
Child 
Mortality 
-3.822 -8.531* -7.032 -6.64 -0.551 -11.454 
 -4.337 -4.588 -5.456 -4.47 -6.004 -11.03 
Child 
Mortality L1 
2.86 8.345 7.23 9.406 -2.375 10.224 
 -5.91 -7.36 -5.283 -7.211 -9.73 -18.085 
Child 
Mortality L2 
1.103 -1.037 -2.707 -4.312 3.71 0.089 
 -3.134 -3.71 -4.068 -3.824 -5.39 -9.033 
Urban 0.190* 0.122* 0.198** 0.211*** -0.137 -0.437* 
 -0.106 -0.073 -0.091 -0.064 -0.191 -0.258 
Share Spend 
Tertiary 
0.444 0.757** 0.186 0.126 0.635 1.149 
 -0.387 -0.338 -0.311 -0.326 -0.634 -0.84 
Share Spend 
Tertiary L1 
-0.025 -0.233 0.087 -0.227 -0.096 -0.239 
 -0.28 -0.296 -0.229 -0.311 -0.505 -0.603 
Share Spend 
Tertiary L2 
-0.095 -0.044 0.166 0.311 -0.385 -0.368 
 -0.243 -0.223 -0.308 -0.24 -0.366 -0.51 
Constant 74.793** 59.172** 53.898 50.889** 162.616*** 188.639*** 
 -34.361 -24.319 -48.268 -23.599 -48.259 -70.652 
Observations 359 316 226 213 133 103 






6.3) Results: With Lagged Effects 
6.3.1) Primary 
In tables 8, 9 & 10; lags were included in an attempt to explain the incorrect signs and 
unexpected correlations between the government expenditure variables and the persistence 
and repeater rates. As mentioned before; unlike enrolment; persistence and repeater rates are 
variables that take time to be achieved.  
They are therefore affected by lagged effects and so in these regression results, lagged 
variables have been included. Only the first and second lags have been included. The length 
to which effects are lagged could be longer than two years, so included the first and second 
lag may not be enough lags to fully capture the lagged effects. However; due to data 
constraints, only the two years are available for analysis. 
The result of including lagged variables in the regression seems positive in terms of the 
government spending variables. In all measures of government spending; the signs that are 
incorrect in the current time period corrects in the first and second lag. The child mortality 
rate becomes significant in terms of repeater rates at the second lag. As a proxy for nutrition, 
this could be explained as increases in malnutrition in the child’s early year’s leads to the 
child having to repeat grades later in life. 
6.3.2) Secondary 
In tables 11; one can see that lags do not appear to have much of an effect on the public 
expenditure on education variables. Mortality seems to become very significant over time. 
Model fit seems to increase with the inclusion of lags, in the FE and IV models. In tables 12 
& 13; again same as primary, child mortality seems to become significant over the years; 
more so in developing countries than in advanced. This is expected since developing 
countries are more affected by lack of food and high mortality rates.  
The models presented here better explains variations in educational outcomes in developing 
than it does for advanced countries. But both of these models suffer from a small amount of 





In tables 14; there are large, significant effects of government spending over time. This can 
lead to the conclusion that government expenditure is affected by lagged effects particularly 
on a tertiary level. So government expenditure in the past affects current educational 
outcomes. In other words; the effects of government spending on not fully felt in the current 
period but rather take up to two years, or may be more, to be reflected in educational 
outcomes. This can simply be because of the nature of the market. Changes take time and so 
time is important and so are lags. 
There are still large negative effects of a young population on enrolment rates, same as in the 
results without lags and similarly with population density or urbanisation. And mortality rates 
also become significant in the first and second lags and this shows that mortality rates also 
take time to fully impact educational outcomes. In terms of model fit; there is not much 
difference in significance across all the models that have included lags. 
6.3.4) Concluding remarks: 
After the inclusion of lags; there are a few more key aspects that can be observed. Firstly; 
child mortality rates are affected by lagged effects. In other words; child mortality rates of the 
past affect future educational outcomes. Government expenditure is also affected by lagged 
effects particularly on all levels of education. Similar to child mortality rates; government 
expenditure in the past affects future educational outcomes. Lagged variables were included 
so as to correct unexpected correlations and in some cases; in the first and second lag these 
correlation corrects but not in all cases. Similar to the results without lags; there are also very 
low model fit for the IV models. This suggests that the instruments used in the models may 








6.4) Tests for Autocorrelation & Heteroscedasticity 
In chapter 4 a number of issues concerning the data were discussed. Two of these were 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. In this subsection, the results for the tests are 
discussed. The Breusch–Pagan test for heteroscedasticity was conducted. The Breusch-
Godfrey test for autocorrelation was conducted. The null hypothesis for no autocorrelation is 
rejected for all levels of education. Autocorrelation was found to be present. Similarly, the 
null hypothesis for no heteroscedasticity was rejected at all conventional significance levels 
and for all models. Thus, heteroscedasticity was present. The results for the tests can be found 
in tables B.1 & B.2 in Appendix B. Since the data is auto-correlated and heteroscedastic, 
which biases the variances of the coefficient estimates, robust standard errors are used 
(Gujarati & Porter, 2009). 
 
6.5) Concluding Remarks 
These concluding remarks provide a brief overview of the data analysis in this chapter. This 
study is similar to Gupta et al (2002) in its aims, but there are three main differences in terms 
of scope, data and methodology. With regards to scope, this study has broader scope since it 
compared the effectiveness of government spending at different levels of education. In terms 
of data, this study includes more countries as well as more repeated observations. The results 
produced by Gupta et al look at the mentioned two years but there are no repeated 
observations of any country in their study. It is useful to briefly compare the results of Gupta 
et al’s study with the work that has been presented here. Although both of the results of the 
two studies are not directly comparable, one can note the similarities. The analysis presented 
here show that government expenditure on education has a limited impact on educational 
outcomes. In the concluding remarks, Gupta et al notes that definitive evidence for a causal 
relationship between public spending and education attainment is lacking such that greater 
public spending on primary and secondary education does not result in a positive impact on 
widely used measures of education attainment (2002). They further conclude that educational 
outcomes are more affected by child mortality rates and are correlated with other influences 
such as per capita income and urbanization (Gupta et al, 2002). This is similar to what was 
presented in the data analysis of this study. Gupta et al further note that there may be other 
influences such as private sector spending, literacy rates as well as access to safe sanitation 
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and water (2002). These effects have neither been included in the data analysis of this study 






The ideas that have been presented here do not strive so much for novelty as they do strive to 
offer a different approach to interpreting already existing ideas. This study has established 
what impacts educational outcomes; from government spending, all the way to nutrition and 
urbanisation. This study was done not with the aim to ‘think out of the box’ as it were, but to 
build up the box, reinforce it with further research, data and argument. 
The research objectives that were set out in chapter one were achieved. First; to review 
literature to determine what impacts educational outcomes. This was accomplished in the 
literature in chapter two. Second; to establish relevant models that will express what affects 
educational outcomes. This was accomplished in chapter three; the education model. Third; 
to analyse the data from selected countries over the time period of 2000 to 2010 by use of the 
models that have been established. This was achieved during the data analysis process; 
chapters six, seven and eight. Lastly; to answer the question does government spending 
influence educational outcomes? After analysing the data; one can conclude this study by 
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 Table of Countries: 
Appendix 
 
Table A1) Table of All Countries 




(1) Afghanistan (50) Curacao (99) Kazakhstan (148) Pakistan (197) Tunisia 
(2) Albania (51) Cyprus (100) Kenya (149) Palau (198) Turkey 
(3) Algeria (52) Czech Rep. (101) Kiribati (150) Panama (199) Turkmenistan 
(4) American Samoa (53) Denmark (102) Korea Dem. Rep. (151) Papua New Guinea (200)  Turks & Caicos Islands 
(5) Andorra (54) Djibouti (103) Korea Rep. (152) Paraguay (201) Tuvalu 
(6) Angola (55) Dominica (104) Kosovo (153) Peru (202) Uganda 
(7) Antigua (56) Dominican Rep. (105) Kuwait (154) Philippines (203) Ukraine 
(8) Argentina (57) Ecuador (106) Kyrgyz Rep. (155) Poland (204)  United  
Arab Emirates (9) Armenia (58) Egypt (Arab Rep.) (107) Lao (156) Portugal 
(10) Aruba (59) El Salvador (108) Latvia (157) Puerto Rico (205) United Kingdom 
(11) Australia (60) Equatorial Guinea (109) Lebanon (158) Qatar 
(12) Austria (61) Eritrea (110) Lesotho (159) Romania (206) United States 
(13) Azerbaijan (62) Estonia (111) Liberia (160) Russia Fed. 
(14) Bahamas (63) Ethiopia (112) Libya (161) Rwanda (207) Uruguay 
(15) Bahrain (64) Faeroe Islands (113) Liechtenstein (162) Samoa (208) Uzbekistan 
(16) Bangladesh (65) Fiji (114) Lithuania (163) San Marino (209) Vanuatu 
(17)Barbados (66) Finland (115) Luxembourg (164) Sao Tome (210) Venezuela 
(18) Belarus (67) France (116) Macao (China) (165) Saudi Arabia (211) Vietnam 
(19) Belgium (68) French Polynesia (117) Macedonia (166) Senegal (212) Virgin Islands 
(20) Belize (69) Gabon (118) Madagascar (167) Serbia 
(21) Benin (70) Gambia (119) Malawi (168) Seychelles (213) West Bank & Gaza 
(22) Bermuda (71) Georgia (120) Malaysia (169) Serra Leone 
(23) Bhutan (72) Germany (121) Maldives (170) Singapore (214) Yemen Rep. 
(24) Bolivia (73) Ghana (122) Mali (171) St. Maarten 
(25) Bosnia (74) Gibraltar (123) Malta (172) Slovak Rep. (215) Zambia 
(26)Botswana (75) Greece (124) Marshal Islands (173) Slovenia (216) Zimbabwe 
(27) Brazil (76) Greenland (125) Mauritania (174) Solomon Islands  
(28) Brunei Darussalam (77) Grenada (126) Mauritius (175) Somalia  
(29) Bulgaria (78) Guam (127) Mayotte (176) South Africa  
(30) Burkina Faso (79) Guatemala (128) Mexico (177) South Sudan  
(31) Burundi (80) Guinea (129) Micronesia (178) Spain   
(32) Cambodia (81) Guinea-Bissau (130) Moldova (179) Sri Lanka  
(33) Cameroon (82) Guyana (131) Monaco (180) St. Kitts  
(34) Canada (83) Haiti (132) Mongolia (181) St Lucia  
(35) Cape Verde (84) Honduras (133) Mongolia (182) St Martin  
(36) Cayman Islands (85) Hong Kong (China) (134) Morocco (183) St. Vincent  
(37) Central Africa (86) Hungary (135) Mozambique (184)  Sudan  
(38) Chad (87) Iceland (136) Myanmar (185) Suriname  
(39) Channel Islands (88) India (137) Namibia (186) Swaziland  
(40) Chile (89) Indonesia (138) Nepal (187) Sweden  
(41) China (90) Iran (Islamic Rep.) (139) Netherlands (188) Switzerland  
(42)  Colombia (91) Iraq (140) New Caledonia (189) Syrian Arab Rep.  
(43) Comoros (92) Ireland (141) New Zealand (190) Tajikistan  
(44) Congo (Dem. Rep.) (93) Isle of Man (142) Nicaragua (191) Tanzania  
(45) Congo (Rep.) (94) Israel (143) Niger (192) Thailand  
(46) Costa Rica (95) Italy  (144) Nigeria (193) Timor-Leste  
(47) Cote d’Ivoire (96) Jamaica (145) Northern Mariana Islands (194) Togo  
(48) Croatia (97) Japan (146) Norway (195) Tonga  
(49) Cuba (98) Jordan (147) Oman (196) Trinidad  
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(141) New Zealand 
(146) Norway 
(156) Portugal 
(163) San Marino 
(170) Singapore 





(205) United Kingdom 
(206) United States 







 Data Analysis: 
Appendix 
 
Table B.1: Breusch-Godfrey test results for autocorrelation: 
Where the null hypothesis is no autocorrelation; 
Source: Own calculations using the World Development Indicators databank 
 
Table B.2: Breusch–Pagan test results for heteroscedasticity: 
Where the null hypothesis is no heteroscedasticity; 
 
Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Enrolment 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Persistence 0.0000 0.0000 - 
Repeater 0.0000 0.0000 - 
Source: Own calculations using the World Development Indicators databank 
 
 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Enrolment 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Persistence 0.0258 0.0359 - 
Repeater 0.0000 0.0000 - 
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